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Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals: Injecting the
Counterfeit Element into the Public Health
Bryan A. Liangt
ABSTRACT
Varying prices for medicines create incentives to move
products from one market to another in an effort to arbitrage the
difference; this is known as parallel trade. Nevertheless, this
situation allows nefarious individuals to introduce counterfeits into
the drug supply due to weaknesses in detection. Both developed
and developing countries around the world experience this
phenomenon. The United States has so far been relatively
insulated from such effects, but through potential legalized
importation and illegal parallel trade through Internet purchases,
the risk that the European Union has experienced may threaten
the United States. Unfortunately, efforts to permit parallel
importation of drugs into this country, such as under the
Pharmaceutical Market and Drug Safety Act, do not adequately
address safety and security issues of parallel trade. The
vulnerabilities of the U.S. system, and the lessons from regions
such as the European Union which has permitted parallel trade in
pharmaceuticals, indicate that a multidisciplinary policy strategy
involving at least a public health campaign, reporting system,
increased penalties for counterfeiting, and technology investment
must be engaged before any parallel trade in medicines is
permitted. Otherwise, the safety and security of the U.S. medicine
supply will assume the weaknesses and risk that other regions
experience.
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I. Introduction
The cost of prescription drugs is a critical issue faced by many
around the world. Prices are very high in some markets, but less
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so in others. There are strong incentives for moving drugs from
one market to another, usually across country borders, to take
advantage of price differentials, that is, parallel trade. Although
some would perform this arbitrage activity legally, such price
differentials also create incentives for unethical actors to enter into
the market of parallel trade in order to introduce tainted and
counterfeit drugs. This occurs all over the world in developed
nations, particularly in the European Union, which has permitted
parallel trade for some time.' These dishonest players peddle
fakes through vulnerabilities in the drug distribution system.
In the United States, counterfeits are a growing problem, but
our domestic, closed system has so far maintained a high level of
safety.2 However, the United States faces a similar downside
potential for parallel importation as experienced by the European
Union since Congress is considering permitting medicine
importation.3 Without extensive new infrastructures involving
safety systems, stakeholder awareness of the problem, robust
reporting systems, appropriate laws and regulations, investment in
technology, and coordination of these components, parallel drug
importation into the United States could very well open U.S.
borders to tremendous problems with fakes, creating harm,
supporting crime, and reducing the benefits associated with
advances in pharmaceuticals.
This paper reviews some of the issues associated with parallel
trade, counterfeit drugs, and drug importation. In Part I, this paper
I See infra notes 4-32 and accompanying text; see also Albert Wertheimer, et al.,
Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: Current Status and Future Projections, 43 J. AM. PHARM.
Assoc. 710 (2003); P. Rudolf & I. Bernstein, Counterfeit Drugs, 350 NEw ENGL. J. MED.
1384 (2004); L. Gibson, Drug Regulators Study Global Treaty to Tackle Counterfeit
Drugs, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 486 (2004); H. Frankish, WHO Steps up Campaign on
Counterfeit Drugs, 362 LANCET 1730 (2003); INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF NURSES,
NURSES FOR PATIENT SAFETY: TARGETING COUNTERFEIT AND SUBSTANDARD MEDICINES
(2005), http://www.icn.ch/indkit2005.pdf.
2 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HHS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMP.:
REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION 37-38 (Dec. 2004), http://www.hhs.
gov/importtaskforce/Report1220.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. Note that the only
parties that can legally parallel import drugs for domestic use are the manufacturers
themselves. Id.
3 Statement of Randall W. Lutter, Ph.D., Acting Associate Comm'r Policy and
Planning, Food and Drug Admin. Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives (Nov. 1, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/ola/2005/counterfeitl 01.html.
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reviews the European experience with respect to parallel trade. In
Part II, the U.S. system is considered. In Part III, rationales
underlying counterfeit production within the parallel trade system
are outlined. In Part IV, the 109th Congress importation bill, the
Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act, also known
as the Dorgan Drug Importation Bill, is reviewed. In Part V, a
multidisciplinary proposal is offered that would allow a better
understanding of the burdens of counterfeit drugs and means to
counteract them. Finally, in Part VI, the paper offers some
recommendations to prevent the influx of counterfeits into the
drug supply.
II. The European Experience: Parallel Trade and
Counterfeits
Although counterfeit problems are not well known in the
United States,4 they are common throughout the rest of the world.5
4 "When people [in the United States] think of counterfeits, they don't usually
think pharmaceuticals .... [But] [a]n entire range of products are counterfeited and some
of them produce obvious health and safety issues." Don Oldenburg, Raising the Alarm
on Counterfeit Drugs, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 5, 2005, at C9 (quoting Darren Pogoda,
Staff Attorney, International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition). Note, however, that U.S.
citizens may be traveling to countries that have a high level of counterfeits. For
example, there is a growing trend of Americans and others obtaining health care in India.
See, e.g., Ramola Talwar Badam, Westerners Seek Cheap Medical Care in Asia, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 24, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2005/09/24/
international/i1 30437D67.DTL&type=printable.
5 See, e.g., Mark Henderson, Junk Medicine: Medication Fraud, TIMES (London),
Mar. 19, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,8122-1530033,00.html (describing
conviction of counterfeiter; he was found with over £6 million worth of fake drugs and a
laboratory capable of producing half a million pills daily); Jun P. Yap, NBI Warns
Consumers on Cheap but Fake Medicines, DAILY TRIBUNE (Phil.), Dec. 3, 2005,
http://www.tribune.net.ph/metro/20051203.met01 .html (describing fake medicines being
offered at "low-cost" by neighborhood drug store); Counterfeit Medicine Ring Busted,
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BUREAU, Dec. 9, 2005, http://www.cib.gov.tw/English/
news/newsscontent.aspxCNSerial=69 (reporting fake drug seizures of Zantac,
Reductil, Stinox, Viagra, Cialis, flu treatment, and "unknown drug pills"); Huge Amount
of Fake Pills Seized, BULGARIAN NEWS NETWORK, Aug. 5, 2005, http://www.
bgnewsnet.com/story.php?lang=en&sid=20484 (describing Bulgarian anti-organized
crime unit seizing 200,000 fake anti-headache pills); Venezuela, SAFEMEDS WEEKLY
NEWS UPDATE, Nov. 4, 2005, http://www.safemedicines.org (reporting Venezualan
counterfeit estimates, which may be lower than other South American countries,
reviewing Illegal Sale of Drugs Represents 8% of Venezuelan Pharmaceutical Market,
WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Nov. 30, 2005); see also infra notes 18-28 and
accompanying text (describing some European issues with counterfeit drugs).
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International drug counterfeiting is due, in part, to the presence of
parallel trade. In medicines, this can be illustrated by international
drug importation and re-importation in and between Europe and
other countries around the world.
A. Incentives
The incentive to engage in drug counterfeiting is attributable in
part to differences in medicine pricing among European countries,6
and is permitted in the European Union under Article 28 and
Article 81 of the European Commission Treaty for the Free
Movement of Goods and Services within the Internal Market of
Tragically, although all persons are potentially affected by counterfeit drugs, at present,
according to the World Health Organization, the poor are more susceptible to fake drugs
than other populations. See WHO Warns the Poor are Increasingly at Risk from
Counterfeits, SAFEMEDS WEEKLY NEWS UPDATE, Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.
safemedicines.org.
6 See World Health Org., Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy (June 28, 2004),
http://www.who.int/countries/eth/areas/medicines/en/index.html. Because of significant
price differentials, "hugely divergent prices exist ... which in turn allows counterfeit
products to be introduced." Id. See Global Forum on Pharmaceutical Anticounterfeiting
Calls for Increased Corporate Responsibility and a Framework Convention, EMEDIA
WIRE, Mar. 21, 2005, http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:082pF3YBUekJ:www.pharma-
anticounterfeiting.info/files/uploadedfiles/674/ForumMediaA]ertMar5.doc+Global+For
um+on+Pharmaceutical+Anticounterfeiting+Calls++for++Increased++Corporate++Resp
onsibility++and++a++Framework++Convention,&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd= 1 &client
=safari (describing Second Global Forum on Pharmaceutical Counterfeiting, Paris,
France, and policy statements emanating from it). For example, Switzerland has been
subject to at least two major cases of counterfeit drug trafficking over the past three
years; in response, it has convened a Council of Europe meeting on the topic sponsored
by the Swiss Agency for Therapeutic Products (Swissmedic); Matthew Allen,
Switzerland Joins Fight Against Fake Drugs, SWISSINFO, Sept. 20, 2005,
http://www.nzz.ch/2005/09/20/eng/article6099293.html. Note also that the European
Union has had similar problems with foodstuffs representing a very similar process as
counterfeit drugs. For example, Switzerland and Ireland have reported illegally imported
foods that are linked to organized crime and unsafe product conditions. See, e.g., Adam
Beaumont, Illegal Meat Trade Sparks Health Fears, NZZ ONLINE (May 23, 2005),
http://www.nzz.ch/2005/05/23/eng/article5799697.html; Illegal Food Import Seizures
Rise, BBC NEWS, May 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/northemireland/
4579099.stm.
Of course, other parts of the world beyond Africa, Europe, and Asia have
been affected, such as Australia. See Pan Can't Pay $3m Fine; Liquidator, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Dec. 13, 2005, http://www.smh.com.au/news/NationalfPan-fined-
3m-over-counterfeit-drugs/2005/12/13/1134236045453.html (reporting pharmaceutical
firm in Australia fined $3 million for supplying counterfeit drugs, and has gone into
receivership).
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the EU countries.7 This principal of free movement mandates that
no country within the European Union may place legal, legislative,
or other types of barriers preventing trade between members.8
Further, an owner of a trademark may not use its rights to prevent
repackaging of the medicinal product if the repackaging will not
adversely affect the original condition of the product.9 Hence,
through the regulatory system's consent to parallel trade, drugs
may pass through many countries and scrupulous and
unscrupulous sellers' hands before ending up in a pharmacy.'°
Under such a rubric, legitimate drugs in route to another
market may be replaced with fake, tainted, different, expired,
concentrated, or diluted drug forms and/or ineffective materials;'
7 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMISSION ON PARALLEL
IMPORTS OF PROPRIETARY MEDICINAL PRODUCTS FOR WHICH MARKETING AUTHORIZATIONS
HAVE ALREADY BEEN GRANTED, Dec. 30, 2003, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/
2003/com2003_0839en01.pdf; Nigel Gregson, Keiron Sparrowhawk, Josephine
Mauskopf, & John Paul, Pricing Medicines: Theory and Practice, Challenges and
Opportunities, 4 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG DISCOVERY 121, 128 (2005).
8 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 7.
9 See id. at 12 ("It follows that the proprietor of the trade mark may not use his
trade mark right in order to prevent repackaging when . . . the repackaging cannot
adversely affect the original condition of the product.").
10 The problem of the counterfeit drugs is well known around the world. The
World Health Organization (WHO) has reported that a significant fraction of the world's
drug supply is counterfeit; although absolute figures are difficult to ascertain, WHO
estimates that up to sixty percent of drugs in some developing countries are fake, and up
to twenty percent in some developed countries are fake. WORLD HEALTH ORG., FACT
SHEET No. 275: SUBSTANDARD AND COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES, 2003, http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs275/en. In some cases, such as drugs to treat malaria, up
to ninety percent have been found to be fake. See Dr Shigeru Omi, WHO Regional
Director for the Western Pacific Talks at the Fifty-Sixth Session of the Regional
Committee, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 19, 2005, http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.
pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/09-19-2005/0004109770&EDATE=. Overall, it is
estimated that approximately ten to fifteen percent of all drugs sold in the world are
counterfeit. Id. R. Cockburn et al., The Global Threat of Counterfeit Drugs: Why
Industry and Governments Must Communicate the Dangers, 2 PLOS MEDICINE e100,
Apr. 2005, http://medicine.plosjoumals.org/archive/1549-1676/2/4/pdf/10.1371_journal.
pmed.0020100-S.pdf.
II See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang, Fade to Black: Importation and Counterfeit Drugs, 38
AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 4-10, on file with author). Wrong
drugs can be substituted through use of vials, sometimes purchased on online auction
sites such as Ebay, that are also used for other drugs. Id. at 8. Beyond patients being
subjected to the wrong drug, if the disease being treated is an infectious disease, there is
a mistaken impression that the disease is resistant to first line therapies, resulting in the
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or legitimate drugs (or diluted drugs with active ingredients) may
be mixed with counterfeits, a process known as "salting."'12 In the
latter effort, even if drug supplies are checked, the actual
pharmaceutical ingredient will still be detected, in an effort to fool
inspectors, pharmacists, patients, and others into believing the
products are legitimate. 3
It bears emphasis that repackaging drugs is permitted and
expected in Europe 4 as well as the United States. 5 The resulting
importation, re-importation, repackaging, and reselling between
parties can and does allow fake drugs to enter into legitimate
country supplies that may be sold in pharmacies 6 and be taken by
patients. 
17
use of higher level, stronger antibiotics, which contribute to the increasing resistance of
the pathogen. Id. at 44. Incorrect concentrations of drugs have included highly
concentrated Botox treatment, which almost killed several patients and the doctors that
was administering it, as well as cancer treatments to build up red blood cells that were
instead bacterially-contaminated water injected directly into the patient. Id. at 8. Use of
nonsterile and/or completely inappropriate materials to mimic the drug is also a source of
harm, with materials such as floor wax, boric acid, which is a cockroach-killing agent,
toxic yellow road paint, concrete powder, and antifreeze have been documented for use
in counterfeit drugs. Id. at 9. The latter killed over 500 children. Id.
12 Lew Kontnik, Pharmaceutical Counterfeiting: Preventing the Perfect Crime
(2004), http://www.fffenterprises.com/web-files/fff-wht-ppr_l 11804.pdf.
13 See, e.g., Susan Todd, Florida Man Admits Sale of Fake Lipitor, STAR-LEDGER
(NJ), Feb. 10, 2005, at 60 (describing Lipitor salting by convicted cocaine traffickers);
and Todd Datz, Drug Busters, CSO ONLINE, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.csoonline.com/
read/l 10105/counterfeit.html ("If someone reached into your [potential counterfeit
supply] container and took out one Lipitor capsule and tested it, and it turned out to be
genuine, it does not mean the rest of the capsules in that container are genuine," quoting
James Christian, Chief Security Officer, Novartis).
14 Testimony of James Christian, House Committee on Energy and Commerce:
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Product Counterfeiting:
How Fakes Are Undermining U.S. Jobs, Innovation, and Consumer Safety (June 15,
2005), http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/06152005hearing 1551/Christian.
pdf.
15 Id.
16 "Shell pharmacies" have been used to illegally buy and sell drugs, illustrating
the ease by which systems may be penetrated for inappropriate means. See, e.g., Denise
Kalette, Florida Authorities Arrest 10 in Massive Internet Drug Sweep, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, July 15, 2005, http://www.signonsandiego.comnews/nation/20050715-1422-
intemetdrug-arrests.html (describing Internet pharmacy selling millions of dollars of
drugs illegally through shell pharmacies).
17 World Health Org., Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy (June 28, 2004),
http://www.who.int/countries/eth/areas/medicines/en/index.html; see also Evelyn Ring,
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
B. Examples
There have been significant counterfeit issues in Europe
domestically and across international lines relating to parallel
trade. Madame Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Secretary of
the Council of Europe, in her opening speech to the Council of
Europe seminar, Counteract the Counterfeiters!, emphasized the
significant problem of counterfeit drugs in the European Union:
Let me summarize some facts about the counterfeit medicine
situation in Europe:
" WHO estimates that counterfeit medicines make up for 8% to
10% of the European pharmaceutical market and in some
countries even as much as 12%.
" Experts are convinced that counterfeiting medicine is on the
rise in Europe.
" Counterfeit medicines often appear so like the genuine
product that neither healthcare professionals nor patients can
detect which is the genuine product before using it. Hence,
the patient undergoes the risk of using an ineffective, or less
effective or even toxic compound not worth being called a
medicine or worth the price the individual or the health-care
system pays for it.
* All categories of medicine are profitable targets for
counterfeiters-so called life-style medicines as well as
essential medicines like antibiotics and insulin.
" Several indicators suggest that organi[z]ed crime has found a
currently lucrative and nearly safe business of counterfeiting
medicines to generate resources for other criminal activities.
Organi[z]ed crime puts public heath and the health of
individual citizens at stake, and aims at creating widespread
corruption networks which hinder democratic and economic
development and welfare. This also deprives the private
sector of legitimate revenue.
Against this background, it is very worrying that there is no
recogni[z]ed central reference point in Europe entrusted with
Counterfeit Drugs Will Kill, Expert Warns, IRISH EXAM'R, Oct. 12, 2005, http://archives.
tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2005/10/12/story128556160.asp ("New research shows that one in
five Irish people have discovered that on purchase their medicine leaflets are missing,
seals are broken, or the medicine is contained in a foreign packaging, all signs that the
chemist might have unwittingly sold them counterfeit drugs.").
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surveillance, trend analysis and policy recommendations
in the field of counterfeit medicines. This situation helps the
counterfeiters who can rely on lacking national and international
co-operation information gaps in Europe. Even when they are
caught, they far too often get away with administrative fines
with no deterrent effect.'
8
There is good reason for this worry, since examples abound.
The U.K. authorities identified and caught a counterfeit
manufacturer and supplier capable of producing half a million
fakes each day who disseminated those products through parallel
trade means across Europe.' 9 This case follows several recalls and
previous U.K. counterfeit discoveries 2° as well as more recentcounterfeits discoveries. 21 These circumstances have resulted in
18 Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe
on the Occasion of the Seminar, Opening Speech "Counteract the counterfeiters!",
Limiting the Risks of Counterfeit Medicines to Public Health in Europe by Adequate
Measures and Mechanisms, (Sept. 21, 2005), http://www.coe.intlT/E/Com/press/News/
2005/2005092 ldisc-sga.asp.
19 Sam Lister, The £6m Secret Factory that Churned out Thousands of Fake Viagra
Tablets, TIMES (London), Nov. 27, 2004, http://www.groupsrv.cornscience/viewtopic.
php?p=535168.
20 Counterfeit Zantac from Greece was detected in the United Kingdom in
1994. See GRAHAM SATCHWELL, A SICK BUSINESS 49 (2004). Counterfeit Cialis and
Reductil were detected in August and September 2004; see G. P. MATTHEWS, MED.
AND HEALTHCARE PROD. REGULATORY AGENCY, DRUG ALERT, (Aug. 24, 2004),
http://www.info.doh.gov.uk/doh/embroadcast.nsf/vwDiscussionAll/B20A3094D975C9B
180256EFA00338EEl?OpenDocument; see G. P. MATTHEWS, MED. AND HEALTHCARE
PRODUCTS REGULATORY AGENCY, DRUG ALERT, (Sept. 2, 2004), http://www.info.
doh.gov.uk/doh/embroadcast.nsf/fd 1653b6e6be59d l80256b7900507749/ef724a067dc94
0a680256f03004e9df0?OpenDocument.
21 Fake Lipitor has been found in the United Kingdom salted with real Lipitor. See
IAN HOLLOWAY, MEDICINES AND HEALTHCARE PRODUCTS REGULATORY AGENCY,
DRUG ALERT, July 28, 2005, http://www.info.doh.gov.uk/doh/embroadcast.nsf/fd1653b6
e6be59d180256b7900507749/fa895cc99606f5ee8025704c0050e887?OpenDocument; Sam
Lister, Heart Pills Taken by Millions Recalled as Fakes Are Found, TIMES (London),
July 28, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1713086,00.html (reporting
statements by head of intelligence at the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory
Agency, Nimo Ahmed, indicating the discovery of the counterfeit drugs, which came
from outside of the European Union, showed that counterfeit medicines could get into
any supply chain, even the United Kingdom's, which is one of the most difficult to
penetrate). See also Celia Hall, Internet Fuels Boom in Counterfeit Drugs, TELEGRAPH
(U.K.), Aug. 16, 2005, http://health.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/
08/16/ndrugsl6.xml (noting that the Internet has increased counterfeits and "[in the past
year three counterfeit medicines have reached the public in Britain, having penetrated
20061
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calls for heightened efforts beyond the current regulatory safety
structure.22
European investigations have determined that:
[parallel] drug importation in Europe has led to a situation where
drugs often change hands more than 20 times before reaching
their destination, frequently manufactured in one country,
shipped to the country in which they were intended to be
legitimate pharmacy outlets. They were fake Cialis, a drug for impotence, fake Reductil,
a slimming drug, and fake Lipitor, a drug to lower cholesterol."); Andrew Jack, Probe
Ordered After Fake Drugs Find, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, http://news.ft.com/
cms/s/8d9584c4-OeOe-llda-aa67-00000e2511c8.html (noting that the UK medicines
regulator "has launched fresh inquiries into pharmaceutical distributors after discovering
a second batch of counterfeit anti-cholesterol drugs in two weeks); Andrew Jack,
Tackling Counterfeiters Who Make Pills in Cement Mixers: As Production of Fake
Drugs Rises, There are Calls for Greater Efforts to Counter an Industry that Can Kill,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, http://news.ft.com/cms/s/23796da8-OeOe-1 da-aa67-
00000e2511c8.html (noting that "The World Health Organi[z]ation and other
international bodies have called for greater efforts to tackle a problem which-above all
in the developing world-is not only widespread but can be fatal: by failing to give
patients the right medicines at best, and killing them outright at worst."; Catherine
Humble, Inside the Fake Viagra Factory, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Aug. 22, 2005, http://
health.telegraph.co.uk/health/main.j html ?xml=/health/2005/08/23/nviag21 .xml (describing
another discovery of fake Viagra and unsanitary conditions for production of counterfeit
medicines).
22 Top European Security Expert Warns Senate Panel on Risk of Drug Importation;
Urges Congress to Learn from Problems Faced by European Union, PHARMALIVE, Apr.
19, 2005, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=23168 (quoting
Graham Satchwell, former detective superintendent and Association of Chief of Police
Officers' spokesperson on counterfeiting). See also MPs Concerned over Parallel
Import Threat to Patient Safety, CHEMIST & DRUGGIST ONLINE, Dec. 17, 2005,
http://www.dotpharmacy.co.uk/l71205.html#9 (reporting comments by Dr. Brian Iddon,
MP, who called for investigations of parallel trade after Parliamentary debate highlighted
safety concerns). Note also that there are other risks of using Europe as a drug source:
foreign drugs may have the same name as U.S. drugs, but contain different ingredients
due to differences in naming across borders; see Marilyn Chase, Buying the Wrong
Medicine Overseas, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 16, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/
SB 112415070765613880-cKSA6CHExPu3fl UQrvIZABOOuBI_20060815.htmlmod=
public.homeus.
Parallel trade business is deceptively easy to set up and create, illustrating the
highly vulnerable nature of the drug supply in sectors that allow it. In a recent exposd, a
fake parallel trade business was set up with empty cardboard boxes and a single
refrigerator in the United Kingdom. The business then obtained a parallel trade license,
and contracted with a subsequently convicted known pharmaceutical counterfeiter for
supplies. This entity then obtained agreements to sell to pharmacies and hospitals. The
television program was "Tonight with Trevor McDonald: Is Your Medicine Fake?",
(ITV Broadcast Jan. 9, 2006).
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marketed, bought and sold there by wholesalers and then moved
yet again to more expensive markets....
[The] United Kingdom ... imports more prescription drugs
than any other nation in the European community. This opened
the door for counterfeit and other sub-standard medicines to
enter the UK distribution chain. One survey in 2004 revealed
that of 300 imported medicines examined, 25% should have
failed on 'safety reasons,' 50% because of poor quality of
product. In addition 80% failed on legal grounds such as
23intellectual property rights infringement.
The disadvantages of parallel importation resulting in drug
counterfeiting have also affected other European countries. Parallel
trade wholesalers in the Netherlands introduced counterfeits into the
legitimate supply chain in 2004.24 A licensed Italian pharmaceutical
dealer distributed counterfeit gastrointestinal drugs.25  French
customs agents seized 542,000 fake drugs in 2003.26
In a particularly heinous discovery, Spanish authorities raided
half a dozen laboratories that were producing fake steroids,
hormones, and cancer drugs.27 The scope of the activities in the
latter operations was astounding: 20,000 fake doses per hour, with
thirty million doses and ten tons of high-quality fakes found, as
well as vials, capsules, tablets, and doses for injection. 28 These
illicit products were sold through parallel trade in Italy, France,
and Portugal, and more broadly, over the Internet.29
C. Patient Responses
With such extensive and well-publicized seizures across
23 MPs Concerned over Parallel Import Threat, supra note 22. It is estimated that
140 million individually packaged drugs were parallel-imported throughout the
European Union, and in the United Kingdom alone, twenty percent of all prescriptions
filled are from parallel trade sources. See Peter Pitts, Arrests Are Not Enough, HEALTH
CARE NEWS, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artld= 17957.
24 Julian Mount, Safer Pharmaceutical Distribution in Europe, in PROGRESSIONS
2005: THE ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL REPORT 15 (2004).
25 See SATCHWELL, supra note 20.
26 See Partnership for Safe Medicines, Counterfeit Drugs in Europe Fact Sheet
(2005), http://www.safemedicines.org/resources/europe.pdf.
27 See id.
28 Id.
29 See id.
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Europe, patient groups are justifiably alarmed about the
implications of the parallel trade situation. As the United
Kingdom's Patients Association noted, "We are increasingly
concerned not just about counterfeit medicines, but also the
growth of unregulated Internet pharmacies, and the patient safety
implications of repackaging medicines through parallel trade."30 A
representative from the United Kingdom Centre for Mental Health
noted: "We've been saying for some time that parallel trade is the
supply chain's soft underbelly, that it is a potential weak spot.
Well, given what we've uncovered, you can now remove the word
'potential'; it's a real risk, and it's here now."'"
The European parallel trade, importation/re-importation
situation has been summarized aptly:
The complex nature of the supply chain across Europe results in
some medicines exchanging hands many times before reaching
the patient. This creates more opportunities for counterfeit
products to enter the supply chain than if the products were
sourced nationally. Combined with the accession of ten member
states that are significantly poorer than the rest of the EU and
that have both current and historic trading ties with the former
Soviet Union (where the WHO already estimate the medicine
supply chain to contain up to 10% counterfeit product), it is
almost inevitable that counterfeit medicines will enter the EU
supply chain.32
30 Epilepsy in the Media News Archive, Conference Spotlights Medication
Importing and Counterfeiting, (Sept. 14, 2004), http://www.epilepsy.org.uk/news/
archive/20040914.html.
31 The Partnership for Safe Medicines, New Portfolio Highlights the Serious
Problem of Fake Prescription Drugs in Europe, (July 28, 2005), http://www.safe
medicines.org/resources/001666.html.
32 See Partnership for Safe Medicines, supra note 26 (including a statement by
Niall Maclean of the Social Market Foundation noting parallel trade in the European
Union). See also Severin Carrell, 10S Investigation: On the Trail of the World-Wide
Web of Fake Lifestyle Drugs, INDEP. ON SUNDAY (London), Jan. 18, 2004, at 8 (new E.U.
member countries have "long frontiers [that] border countries such as Russia that are
notorious for the ready availability of fake drugs."). See also Julian Mount, Diminishing
the Risk of Counterfeit Drug, WORLD PHARMACEUTICAL FRONTIERS, http://www.world
pharmaceuticals.net/articles/wpf007_Pfizer.htm. Mount notes that "the website Paypill.
corn had been found to be selling counterfeit medicines for the second time. Paypill.com
has stated, 'We purchase drugs directly from the same parallel imported sources as the
NHS, so if we are selling fakes, then the NHS is selling/dispensing fakes too." Id.
Mount notes that parallel trade also introduces the potential for error at the repackaging
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III.United States "Parallel Trade" and Counterfeits
A. Importation: Legal Underpinnings
Parallel trade in the United States is represented by the
importation of drugs into the United States from sources outside
the country. Currently, however, parallel trade importation of
drugs into the United States is illegal. According to the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA):
virtually all prescription drugs imported for personal use into the
United States from Canada violate the [Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act (FFDCA)] because they are either unapproved
new drugs (21 U.S.C. § 355), labeled incorrectly (21 U.S.C. §§
352, 353), or dispensed without a valid prescription (21 U.S.C. §
353(b)(1)). Importing a drug into the United States that is
unapproved and/or does not comply with the labeling
requirements in the FFDCA is prohibited under 21 U.S.C. §§
331(d), and/or (a). See also 21 U.S.C. §381(a).
FDA approvals are manufacturer-specific, product-specific,
and include many requirements relating to the product, such as
manufacturing location, formulation, source and specifications
of active ingredients, processing methods, manufacturing
controls, packaging location, container/closure system, and
appearance. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50. Generally, drugs sold outside
of the United States are not manufactured or packaged by a firm
that has FDA approval for that drug. Moreover, even if the
manufacturer has FDA approval for a drug, the version produced
for foreign markets usually does not meet all of the requirements
of the United States approval, and thus is unapproved. 21
U.S.C. § 355. The version also may be misbranded because it
may lack certain information that is required under 21 U.S.C. §§
352 or 353(b) but is not required in the foreign country, or it
may be labeled in a language other than English (see 21 C.F.R. §
201.15(c)).
Second, with respect to 'American goods returned,' it is
illegal for any person other than the original manufacturer of a
drug to import into the United States a prescription drug that
was originally manufactured in the United States and sent
abroad (21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1)). This is true even if the drug at
stage, and makes recall difficult when particular problems are identified. Id.
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issue were to comply in all other respects with the FFDCA.
Importing a drug into the United States in violation of section
381(d)(1) is prohibited under 21 U.S.C. § 331(t).
Thus, to ensure compliance with the FFDCA, any person that
intends to import prescription drugs into the United States
must ensure, among other things, that it only imports FDA-
approved drugs that comply with their FDA approvals in all
respects, including manufacturing location, formulation, source
and specifications of active ingredients, processing methods,
manufacturing controls, container/closure system, and
appearance. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50. The importer must also ensure
that each drug meets all applicable U.S. labeling requirements,
and that such drugs are not imported in violation of the
'American goods returned' provision in 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1). 33
FDA personnel do have some discretion regarding personal
importation under certain circumstances, such as:
when the intended use is appropriately identified, such use is not
for treatment of a serious condition, and the product is not
known to represent a significant health risk; or when a) the
intended use is unapproved and for a serious condition for which
effective treatment may not be available domestically either
through commercial or clinical means; b) there is no known
commercialization or promotion to persons residing in the U.S.
by those involved in the distribution of the product at issue; c)
the product is considered not to represent an unreasonable risk;
and d) the individual seeking to import the product affirms in
writing that it is for the patient's own use (generally not more
than 3 month supply) and provides the name and address of the
doctor licensed in the U.S. responsible for his or her treatment
with the product, or provides evidence that the product is for the
continuation of a treatment begun in a foreign country.34
However, this provision is expressly noted not to be a license
for personal importation, generally.35
33 Letter to Gov. Kenny Guinn, State of Nevada, from Randall W. Lutter, Ph.D.,
Associate Comm'r for Policy and Planning, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., (May 20,
2005), http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacomlhottopics/importdrugs/guinnO52005.html.
34 Office of Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Coverage of Personal
Importations, Regulator Procedures Manual ch.9, http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance-
ref/rpm-new2/ch9pers.html.
35 See id.
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B. Parallel Importation and Counterfeits in the United States
Though illegal, the downside of parallel importation experienced
by the European Union, or the introduction of counterfeits in its
legitimate drug supply, is occurring and growing in the United
States. This situation exists because of the potential for re-
importation via Internet pharmacy purchases through state
government web sites and by individual citizens purchasing
through web sites of their own choosing.36 The United States
spends one billion dollars on Internet pharmacy purchases
annually, and that number is rising.37
In addressing parallel importation and Internet trade, much of
the effort has focused on Canada due to its perceived safety and
similarity to the United States. Although some web sites display
Canadian or United States flags, they may not be located in these
countries. There are the substantive questions as to the source of
36 See Letter to The Honorable Michael 0. Leavitt, Secretary, Depart. of Health
and Human Services from John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and
Commerce and Bart Stupak, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, (July
20, 2005), http://www.house.gov/commerce-democrats/Press_109/1091tr29.pdf. Note
that at least two states-Texas and Nevada-although they passed parallel drug laws,
have had their respective Attorneys General conclude that the laws are illegal. See, e.g.,
Clay Robison, Texas Won't Allow Canadian Drugs After All: Import Program Patterned
After One in Minnesota Violated U.S. Law, State's AG Says, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec.
21, 2005, at Al (reporting Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott has concluded that
parallel importation plan for state violated federal law); and Anjeanette Damon, Future
of Nevada Drug Plan Uncertain, RCJ.COM, (Dec. 28, 2005), http://news.rgj.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051228/NEWS07/512280343/1002 (reporting Nevada
Attorney General George Chanos concluded that Nevada parallel importation bill has
"insurmountable legal obstacles").
37 See Julie Appleby, Canada's Cheap Drugs Not the Answer, FDA Warns, USA
TODAY.COM, Aug. 28, 2003, http://www.usatoday.contech/news/2003-08-27-canada
drugs x.htm. This use of Internet pharmacies represents a tremendous safety concern
because, among other things, children are using these sites to obtain drugs for abuse.
See, e.g., Crack Down on Online Pharmacies That Are Selling Drugs to Kids, DEMOCRAT
& CHRONICLE.COM, Aug. 5, 2005, http://www.democratandchronicle.comlapps/pbcs.
dll/article?AID=/20050805/OPINION04/508050365/1041/OPINION (describing National
Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse study reporting abuse by children of
oxycontin and Ritalin obtained through online pharmacies). The Government
Accountability Office notes that the volume of packages of imported prescription drugs
ranges from two million to twenty million annually. See General Accountability Office,
Prescription Drugs: Strategic Framework Would Promote Accountability and Enhance
Efforts to Enforce the Prohibitions on Personal Importation, GAO-05-372 (Sept. 2005),
http://www.house.gov/commercedemocrats/Press 109/dO5372_3.pdf.
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these drugs: are they actually from the countries that the flags
indicate, and are the drugs sold fake or tainted? Pfizer and
Microsoft joined forces to prosecute international spam syndicates
that attempted to sell counterfeit Viagra.38 CanadianPharmacy.com
was one entity targeted by Pfizer and Microsoft, yet although an
ostensibly Canadian site, the locations of individuals controlling
this and related sites are unknown, while the drugs and purchasing
supply chain spans the globe, including India, which is notorious
for its fake drug supply.39
The immense difficulty in finding international counterfeiters
is virtually insurmountable if they are selling over the Internet.
For example, a web address may be licensed in Russia; the server
in China; the company payee for the credit card charge in the
38 Q & A:Pfizer and Microsoft Strike at Alleged Spammers, MICROSOFr, (Feb. 10,
2005), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2005/feb05/02-l0pfizer.mspx.
39 See, e.g., John Leydon, Pfizer and MS Sue Viagra Spam gangs, THE REGISTER
(U.K.), Feb. 10, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/10/spam-lawsuit. Canada
has not been immune to imported counterfeits nor deaths associated with such drugs.
Coroners, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Ontario College of Pharmacists
are investigating several deaths associated with imported counterfeit cardiac drugs sold
from a pharmacy there and, in addition, have brought charges against another pharmacist
for selling fake drugs. See Coroner Probes Five Deaths in Pharmacy Investigation,
CBC.CA, June 23, 2005, http://toronto.cbc.ca/regional/servet/View?filename=to-
pharmacy20050623; Luma Muhtadie, Fake-Drug Case: Huge Forensic Challenges,
HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Canada), July 16, 2005, at A01 (deaths investigated associated
with counterfeits raised to seven with forensic challenges). Note, however, that previous
examples of counterfeit production have found counterfeit operations in Canada,
targeting U.S. consumers. Naturtek, a Quebec site, was found to manufacture fake
Viagra. See John Theriault, Testimony Before the Drug Imp. Task Force, Apr. 5,
2004, reprinted in http://www.hhs.gov/importtaskforcesession2/presentations/Pfizer.doc.
However, counterfeiters in Europe, Canada, and Asia are expanding their counterfeit
products to life saving medicines. It should also be noted that the volume of Internet
imports is growing, and authorities such as Customs and Border Patrol in the United
States simply cannot detect these entries due to limited resources. Both traditional U.S.
international mail facilities as well as private carrier hubs for transport carriers such as
FedEx, UPS, and others have been affected. See Statement of Jayson P. Ahem, Assistant
Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
Sales of Controlled Substances Over the Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives, Dec. 13,
2005, http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/12132005hearing 1738/Ahem.pdf.
Beyond national efforts, private industry is attempting to educate law enforcement to
spot counterfeits at the local level, including pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., Megan Burton
& Kyle Almond, Counterfeit Goods Can Be Unsafe, NEWS 14 CHARLOTTE.COM
(Dec. 6, 2005), www.news l4charlotte.com/contentlocalnews/cabarrus/?AC=&ArD=
108385&SeclD=5.
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United Kingdom; the processing of payment in Australia; and the
product mailed from Chicago, using a return address of an
unsuspecting customer of the website.4 ° The ease by which
Internet pharmacies can procure drugs from outside the United
States and then sell the fake, tainted, or questionable drugs within
the United States is striking. Mark Kolowich, who personally
admits to making "much more" than the seven million dollar
government estimate selling counterfeit drugs before being caught,
outlined the virtually effortless manner in which fake or tainted
drugs from Mexico could be smuggled into the United States and
sold via the Internet to U.S. and European customers.41
Even companies registered in Canada may use imported and
re-imported materials from other, less reliable countries for sale in
the United States. For example, CanadaRx.net, a Hamilton,
Ontario, registered company, has and does send drugs from its
warehouse in the Bahamas;42 Canadatrust.com, a British Columbia
40 See Christopher Rowland, Drug Makers Press Fight vs. Counterfeiters, BOSTON
GLOBE.COM, (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.boston.com/news/globe/healthsciences/
articles/2005/02/14/drug-makers-press-fight-vs counterfeiters/. Of course, in these
situations, no prescription is needed. See, e.g., Online Prescriptions Could be
Dangerous to Your Health, WFSB (CT), (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.wfsb.com/
Global/story.asp?S=4187645 (reporting purchase of Tamiflu without a prescription or
filling in online "medical questionnaire" and reporting that "about 20 percent of the
drugs that are in the world supply are actually counterfeit"). Tamiflu counterfeits have
spurred international efforts to target illegal sellers. See, e.g., Andrew Jack, Health
Regulators Target Illegal Tamiflu, FT.COM, Dec. 20, 2005, http://news.ft.com/cms/
s/cce60a0e-7187-1lda-836-0000779e2340.html (reporting U.S., Dutch, and Austrian
officials launching sting operations against illegal Tamiflu producers and sellers). This
pursuit of illegal sellers follows the discovery of fake Tamiflu in the United States. See
Brian Skoloff, Customs Agents Seize Counterfeit Tamiflu, RADIO NEWS AMERICA, Dec.
18, 2005, http://www.radionewsamerica.comlindex.php?blog=2&p=10074&more=l&
c=l&tb=l&pb=l#morel0074 (describing customs seizures of more than fifty shipments
of counterfeit Tamiflu by U.S. Customs and Border Protection). In addition, the FDA
and Customs and Border Protection are also targeting fraudulent "avian flu drugs." See
Charlene Porter, U.S. Agencies Target Phony Flu Drugs, Bogus Cures: Customs, Drug
Agencies Conduct Criminal Investigations, U.S. State Department, Dec. 20, 2005,
http://usinfo.state.gov/gilArchive/2005/Dec/20-820761 .html.
41 See Heather Won Tesoriero, Tangled Web: For Entrepreneur, Online Drug Sales
Meant Fast Profits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2005, at Al (discussing the case of Mark
Kolowich, an Internet pharmacy entrepreneur).
42 See Christopher Rowland, Drugs from Anywhere: As Importation Networks
Spread, Concerns for Consumer Safety Grow, BOSTON GLOBE.COM, Dec. 16, 2004, http://
www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2004/1l 2/1 6/drugs-from-anywhere?pg=full. Such
sales and shipment can be subject to poor storage and inappropriate conditions that make
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registered company, was selling drugs re-imported from Mexico
that were not approved by Health Canada or the FDA.43 In fact,
most "Canadian" Internet pharmacies are anything but Canadian.'
Graham Satchwell, an international counterfeits expert, has
commented on these developments, noting:
Advertisements were placed on the Web purporting to come
from Canada and yet when drugs were ordered they frequently
came from Malaysia, Vanuatu or Eastern Europe. Rates of
counterfeiting in such places are high, but that aside, the
the drug ineffective or even dangerous. See, e.g., Avoiding a Medicine Meltdown,
WCSH6, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.wcsh6.com/health/article.asp?id=27236.
Note that the FDA, under its Operation Bait & Switch, has found that most drugs
promoted as "Canadian" are really from many other countries, and many of these
products were found to be counterfeit. Assessing drugs over several days in August
2005, the FDA assessed all mail packages from India, Israel, Costa Rica, and Vanuatu at
JFK Airport, Miami International Airport, and Los Angeles International Airport, the
FDA found that approximately eighty-five percent of the drugs they intercepted which
were purportedly "Canadian" were from twenty-seven countries worldwide. More than
forty percent of the orders had been placed with "Canadian" Internet pharmacies; yet
only fifteen percent of the "Canadian" drugs found in this examination were actually
from Canada. More than thirty products tested were found to be counterfeit. See
FDA, FDA Operation Reveals Many Drugs Promoted as "Canadian" Products Really
Originate from Other Countries, FDA NEWS, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.fda.gov/
bbs/topics/NEWS/2005/NEW01277.html.
43 See Mary D. Shepherd, Drug Importation and the Vulnerability of Our
Pharmaceutical Supply Chain, IMPROVING PATIENT CARE AND MEDICATION SAFETY,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ANNUAL ASHP MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE FOR LEADERS IN
HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACY, Chicago, IL 10 (Oct. 2004). Note that even when caught
and ordered to stop illegal importation, Internet importers using the Canadian marketing
veneer continue to operate. For example, an Internet seller affiliated with RxDepot,
which was ordered to stop illegally importing unapproved medicines, terminated its
relationship with RxDepot and continued to sell unapproved drugs as the company
"Canada Care." See FDA Takes Action Against Company for Illegal Importation of
Unapproved, Potentially Unsafe Drugs, FDA.gov, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.fda.gov/
bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW011 42.html.
44 A study performed by Cyveillance for the FDA found that of 11,000 sites it
found claiming to be Canadian pharmacy websites, only 1,009 actually sold prescription
drug products, and of those, only 214 were registered to a Canadian entity. See Jeff
Clabaugh, Survey Finds Few Online Pharmacies Sell Drugs, WASH. Bus. J., June 13,
2005, http://www.bizjoumals.com/washington/stories/2005/06/1 3/daily3.html. Cyveillance
notes that online brand abuses are seen "a lot" in the pharmaceutical industry. The
balance of 795 pharmacy sites had registration information indicating a U.S. owner (the
majority) as well as owners in Vietnam, the Czech Republic, and Barbados. See Ricardo
Alonso-Zaldivar, FDA Casts Suspicion on Online Pharmacies, SEATTLE TIMES, June 15,
2005, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002336462_fdal 5.html.
2006] COUNTERFEIT DRUGS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
likelihood of drugs being time-expired or incorrectly stored are
extremely high.45
C. Legal Vacuums and Disclaimers
Under this regime, parallel importation creates public health
risks. Further, health regulations and government disclaimers
result in little if any protection. It should be noted and emphasized
that there is a legal loophole in health and safety regulation: drug
shipments through countries like Canada or from Europe that are
not for consumption by their citizens are not subject to those
countries' health safety laws. 46 Using countries such as Canada or
45 Top European Security Expert Warns Senate Panel on Risks of Drug
Importation; Urges Congress to Learn from Problems Faced by European Union,
PHARMALIVE, Apr. 19, 2005, http://www.forrelease.com/D20050419/dctu046.P2.0419
2005122047.06226.html (quoting Graham Satchwell, former detective superintendent
and Association of Chief of Police Officers' spokesperson on counterfeiting). Note that
the product is not the only thing counterfeited. Randall W. Lutter, Acting Associate
Commissioner for Policy and Planning at the FDA has indicated that not only are
counterfeit drugs rife around the world, detection is difficult because the product
packaging and labeling as well as containers are easily purchased, created, and/or
counterfeited themselves. Hence, "well-organized criminals have the ability to exploit
our regulatory system and profit at the expense of the public health." See Randall W.
Lutter, PhD, Counterfeit Drugs within the United States, Statement Before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, (Nov. 1, 2005), reprinted in
http://reform.house.gov[UploadedFiles/Randall%20Lutter%20Testimony.pdf.
46 See TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 60-61 ("Health Canada does not assure that
products being sold to U.S. citizens are safe, effective, and of high quality, and does not
intend to do so in the near future," citing Health Canada, Letter from Diane C. Gorman,
Assistant Deputy Minister, to Richard H. Carmona, Surgeon General of the U.S. Public
Health Service, June 1, 2004); World Health Org., Essential Drugs and Medicines
Policy (June 28, 2004), http://www.who.int/countries/eth/areas/medicines/en/index.htrnl;
Christine Clark, British Pharmaceutical Conference 2003: Counterfeiting, 271 PHARM. J.
453, 454 (2003); Diane Gorman, Assistant Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Letter to
THE WASHINGTON POST, (May 9, 2003), http://www.ipi.org/ipi/IPIPressReleases.nsf/0/
b767e60fa3693048525701200540a9c?OpenDocument (stating "The Government of
Canada has never stated that it would be responsible for the safety and quality of
prescription drugs exported from Canada into the United States, or any other country for
that matter."); Marv Shepherd, What if Canada says 'No' to U.S. on Drug Imports?,
USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 2004, at A13; Pharmacists Fault Maine Drug Reimportation
Plan, MaineToday.com, Mar. 31, 2005, http://news.mainetoday.com/indepth/healthcare/
050331drugs.shtml ("Drugs that enter Canada to be exported to customers in the United
States are not subject to review or regulation by Health Canada. There is no guarantee
that imported drugs are safe," quoting Chistopher Gauthier, Maine Pharmacy
Association).
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the United Kingdom as a "post office box" for imported and
exported drugs avoids regulatory oversight of the safety and
efficacy of these materials.
Further, state governmental re-importation programs provide
no protection for products purchased through their programs.
Government drug importation web sites disclaim liability for
medicines purchased from those sites. For example, Washington
state's Canadian drug purchasing website indicates:
The state of Washington makes no warranty, express or implied,
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and
accepts no legal liability, with respect to any product offered, or
pharmaceutical care provided, by the pharmacies listed on this
Web site. Nor does the state of Washington make any
representation regarding the legality or illegality of importing
prescription medications from another country into the United
States. The state of Washington will not indemnify or defend a
user of this web site from federal, state, local or other
prosecution, civil, criminal or administrative action.47
The State of Minnesota's Rx Connect indicates:
Disclaimer of liability
The state of Minnesota makes no warranty, express or implied,
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and
accepts no legal liability, with respect to any product offered, or
pharmaceutical care provided, by the pharmacies listed on this
website.4
The State of Illinois's enrollment form indicates:
[T]he State of Illinois cannot guarantee the safety of any
particular prescription drug purchase. The State of Illinois
makes no representations or warranties as to the safety or
49
efficacy of prescription drugs purchased from foreign sources.
Hence, there is virtually no formal, organized regulatory
47 Washington State Health Care Authority, Prescription Drug Program, Mar. 2,
2006, http://rx.wa.gov/prescriptionhelp/canada.shtrmil.
48 See Minnesota RxConnect, Legal Information, http://www.state.mn.us/cgi-bin/
portal/mn/jsp/content.do?programid=536902438&agency=Rx.
49 I-Save-Rx 2, http://www.i-saverx.net/assetsrx/il-enrollment.pdf. Perhaps because
of this disclaimer, few are using the site to purchase drugs. See, e.g., Daniel C. Vock,
Canada Rx Programs Find New Takers, STATELINE.ORG, Dec. 29, 2005,
http://www.stateline.org/liveNiewPage.action?siteNodeld= 137&languageld= I &content
Id=77136.
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authority or legal recourse for consumers that ensures the safety
and efficacy of parallel imported drugs or any remedy if harm
results from their purchase.
As a practical matter, legal systems have for the most part been
stymied in their efforts to hold Internet portals for medicines
accountable for their product.5 ° Consumers in the United States
and around the world, including the European Union,5 have been
cheated and harmed by rogue Internet pharmacies with no remedy
against these offshore facilities.52 William Hubbard, Associate
Commissioner for Policy and Planning at the FDA, laments that
the "FDA has no ability to take effective action against these
foreign operators on behalf of U.S. citizens."53
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
Michael 0. Leavitt has described the situation:
You could go onto our [I]nternet service provider, go to your
search engine and put in 'Canadian drugs,' it would pull up a
number of different sites. You will see one, I saw one the other
day called the Canadian Generics. And it offered name brand
drugs and generic drugs. FDA tracked it down to look at it; they
found out that the Internet service provider was in China. They
found that the Web site was managed out of Belize. They found
that the check we sent them to buy drugs was cashed in St.
50 "The sale of drugs to U.S. residents via foreign websites is an extremely
challenging area. . . .Foreign sales pose the most difficult challenge for U.S. law
enforcement because the seller is not within U.S. boundaries. Although the FDA may
have jurisdiction over a resident in a foreign country who sells in violation of the [Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act] to a U.S. resident, from a practical standpoint, the Agency
working with DOJ has a difficult time enforcing the law against foreign sellers, when
they are hard to reach and outside our borders." Hearing on Internet Drug Sales Before
the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of William K.
Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, FDA), http://www.fda.gov/
ola/2004/Intemetdrugs0318.html.
51 Jim Thomson, CEO of the Centre for Mental Health in the United Kingdom,
stated that,"[p]otent substances are freely available on the Internet and can be ordered
easily without any prescription and any authentication of sources, making the public
vulnerable to health hazards and public health vulnerable to growing antimicrobial and
drug resistance." Global Forum on Pharmaceutical AntiCounterfeiting Calls for
Increased Corporate Responsibility and a Framework Convention, EMEDIA WIRE, I
Mar. 21, 2005, http://pdfserver.emediawire.conpdfdownload/219649/pr.pdf.
52 Hearing on Internet Drug Sales, supra note 50.
53 See Charles W. Schmidt, Phony pharm, MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY, Nov. 2002
27 (quoting William K. Hubbard, during a Senate committee hearing, July 9, 2002).
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Croix. And the postmark was in Dallas. We got the drugs, and
the first box I looked at was impeccably counterfeited. It looked
exactly like one that would come from a manufacturer. But
when you tested the fluid that was in the syringe that it
packaged, it was tap water. When you tested the chemical
compound that made up the medications, it has the right
ingredients, but they were just in the wrong proportion. Some of
them were as high as 200 percent of what was supposed to be
there. Some of them were as little as 50 percent.... I think drug
safety is going to become a much bigger problem.
54
Parallel importation of drugs is illegal but happening in billion
dollar proportions over the Internet; ironically, recent analyses
have shown that such parallel trade may not in most instances be
cheaper than U.S. purchases.55 Accountability for these sales is
nonexistent, and, practically speaking, even in the context of laws
aimed at attempting some formulation of liability for wrongdoing,
perpetrators easily escape responsibility for their actions. The
potential and actual financial and human harm is astronomical.
54 Letter from John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and
Commerce and Bart Stupak, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce to
The Honorable Michael 0. Leavitt, Secretary, Department of Health and Human
Services (July 20, 2005) http://www.house.gov/commercedemocrats/Press- 109/
1091tr29.pdf.
55 "There are tens of thousands of Web sites that sell prescription drugs of
unknown origin to Americans illegally .... A Web site based in Canada may get its
products from India or China, or may traffic in counterfeits." Matthew Herper, Bad
Medicine, FORBES, May 23, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/business/global/2005/0523/
072.html. It appears that counterfeit Tamiflu, luckily seized by customs officials,
entered the United States this way. See Brian Skoloff, Agents Seize Tamiflu Shipments,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 19, 2005, http://www.azcentral.com/health/news/articles/
1219tamiflul9.html. Further, "Argentinean export records seem to show tens of
thousands of doses of drugs, including knockoffs of erythropoietin and the cancer drugs
Eloxatin and methotrexate, making their way from Argentina into Canada." Id.
Yet an AARP study showed that in the context of Medicare Part D medicine
coverage, five of six common very common drugs were cheaper in the United States as
compared to Canada. See Missouri Pharmacists Applaud AARP Shift in Drug
Importation: Investigation Shows Greater Savings with Medicare Drug Benefit,
PRNEWSWIRE, Jan. 11, 2006, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pACCT=
104&STORY=/www/story/01-11-2006/0004247375&EDATE (discussing AARP study
and Missouri Pharmacy Association comments upon it).
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IV. Driving Forces for Counterfeits in Parallel Trade
A. Easy Profits
Money drives much activity around the world, and,
unsurprisingly, it is a force driving the production and sale of
counterfeits through parallel trade. The World Health
Organization (WHO) and the FDA indicate worldwide sales of
counterfeit drugs represent between $32 billion and $35 billion
annually.56 Such figures represent $88-$96 million in illicit sales
every day.
The sale of fake drugs through vulnerable trade paths is
facilitated by the ease of counterfeit drug production. Compare
making illicit drugs with licit counterfeits. Illicit drug production
is a very difficult, expensive, and highly risky activity; producing
heroin and cocaine surreptitiously is dangerous, requires great
security and skill, and must produce a finished, viable, working
product with clinical effects. Producing counterfeit licit drugs, on
the other hand, is cheap, lucrative, and low risk. Manufacturing
such products can employ unskilled workers, and need only result
in materials that appear authentic-there is no burden on the
producer that they actually result in any therapeutic functionality.
Profit margins are dizzying. A fake pill may cost less than $0.01
to make, but can be sold for $0.30; 5' and, in a coup de grace to
marketing, such pricing still represents a discount compared with
the actual drug. Besides this, selling licit drugs has none of the
costs and risks of clandestine sales of heroin or cocaine.
B. Criminal Element
Because of high-level profits, concomitantly a high-level of
organized crime is involved in taking advantage of supply chain
weaknesses through importation and parallel trade. According to
the FDA and international governmental authorities, counterfeit
drug sales are linked to funding well-organized international
criminal operations and terrorist activities, such as Hezbollah and
Al Qaeda.5" These activities are also occurring in countries such
56 Id. See also Cockburn et al., supra note 10, at 302.
57 Kerry Capell & Suzanne Timmons, What's in that Pill? In Latin America, Fake
Drugs Are as Lucrative as Cocaine, Bus. WEEK, June 18, 2001, at 60.
58 See, e.g., Global Options Inc., An Analysis of Terrorist Threats to the American
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as North Korea, which may engage in large-scale international
crime sponsorship.59 It should also be noted that the FDA has
identified the U.S. drug supply as a potential target for terrorists.
60
Medicine Supply 13-14, 69-70, 159-165 (2003), http://www.globaloptions.com/booktext
2003.pdf; Ben Hirschler, Criminals make killing from fake drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
2, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2005/08/02/criminalsmake
-killing-from fake drugs/?rss-id=Boston.com+%2F+News ("given the low production
costs, [counterfeit drug production] is a hugely lucrative trade and some criminals now
prefer it to narcotics"). Mark Sherman, 87 Charged in Counterfeit Drugs, Money,
Cigarettes, PHILLYBURBS.COM, Aug. 22, 2005, http://www.visioncurrencytech.com/
news/phillyburbs_082205.html (describing crime bust of counterfeit drugs, money,
cigarettes, and consumer products); Gavin Phipps, Counterfeit Pills are Not Placebos:
Many People Regularly Take Prescription Pills. Unfortunately, It Is Quite Likely
the Pills Are Not What They are Supposed To Be, TAIPEI TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at
17, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2005/08/21/2003268655 (describing
Taiwan's counterfeit drug problem with up to thirty percent of some drugs counterfeit
and involvement of organized crime); Celia Hall, Internet Fuels Boom in Counterfeit
Drugs, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Aug. 16, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/08/16/ndrugsl6.xml. "Much of the [counterfeit drug]
supply comes from India and Asia and there are signs that the counterfeit medicines
trade is linking up with organi[z]ed crime. 'If people buy these drugs, they should be
aware of the risk they are taking as well as being aware they may be supporting
organi[z]ed crime or terrorism"' (quoting Naeem Ahmed, head of medicines intelligence,
U.K. Medicines and Healthcare Products). See also Nathansoncentre, http://www.
yorku.ca/nathanson/CurrentEvents/2005-Q3.htm#Counterfeiting (discussing the influx
of counterfeits products into Canada, including medicines, which has led the United
States to place Canada on its watch list "in large part because the United States believes
[Canada] is not doing enough to stop counterfeits at the border and [Canada] is being
used as a transit point for goods destined for the U.S. market"). Further, Canada Border
Services Agency officials do not have the power to search shipments for goods bearing
a counterfeit trademark, nor can it alert the holders of the intellectual property rights
there is an actual or potential trademark infringement. Id. See also International
Anticounterfeiting Coalition, White Paper: The Negative Consequences of International
Intellectual Property Theft: Economic Harm, Threats to the Public Health and Safety,
and Links to Organized Crime and Terrorist Organizations (2005), http://www.
iacc.orglWhitePaper.pdf (describing product piracy effects, including counterfeit drugs,
on U.S. economy and public health).
59 See Jay Solomon & Gordon Fairclough, North Korea's Counterfeit Goods
Targeted: US Seeks to Curb Illicit Business in Cigarettes, Drugs, Currency to Augment
Diplomacy, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2005, at A4. One commentator indicates that drug
companies should not subsidize undemocratic regimes through low drug prices. See
Philip G. Griffiths, Dying for Drugs: Drug Companies Should Not Have to Subsidize
Incompetent Governments [letter], 327 BRIT. MED. J. 343 (2003), http://bmj.bmj
journals.com/cgi/content/full/3277410/343-a.
60 See Associated Press, FDA: Al-Qaida Could Poison Medicines, (Aug. 12, 2004),
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5682351. See also PRNEwSWIRE, Fake Drugs Are Real
Dangers for U.S. Consumers (Aug. 13, 2004), http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-
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C. Light Penalties
Penalties around the world for counterfeit production are
uniformly light. In Latin American countries, known for their
cocaine and heroin production, governments have passed
increasingly stringent laws to penalize and deter the manufacture
and sale of cocaine. Thus, drug lords caught engaging in such
activities may be incarcerated for ten to fifteen years in Latin
61American prisons.
Yet laws regulating production of fake, licit drugs have not
been strengthened accordingly with respect to the gravity of the
harm. Penalties are light-often less than six months in jail, and
with bail, perpetrators get out in just a few days. 62 Therefore, an
unintended consequence of penalties for illicit drug production is
that sound business decision-making has led to a cheaper, less
risky, and more lucrative product and market focus: counterfeit
drugs. Hence, Latin America has become a source of counterfeit
drugs while also being subject to this exploitation itself.63
Domestically, U.S. penalties for drug counterfeiting are also
weak. Indeed, even the FDA recognizes this concern;
counterfeiting a trademark may result in a decade in jail, but
counterfeiting a drug may only lead to a maximum of three years
in prison.64 In many cases drug counterfeiting may result in no jail
bin/stories.pi?ACCT=1 09&STORY=/www/story/08-13-2004/0002231340&EDATE.
61 Capell & Timmons, supra note 57.
62 Id.
63 For example, estimates are that fifteen to twenty percent of the drugs sold in
Peru are fake, stolen, or have expired. See Encarna Nu ez Diaz, Minsa Reports that 20%
of Medicines Sold in Peru Are Counterfeit, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Apr. 14, 2005.
LEXIS, News Library. Indeed, because of its limited enforcement budget, thirty percent
of the 6,000 pharmacies in Lima, the capital, are unlicensed. Compounding the problem
is that twenty percent of drug sales occur in the "informal sector," id., such as night
markets and other non-standard, non-pharmacy locations. The notorious "triple frontier"
area between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is infamous for its counterfeiting activities
in medications and other products. Id. See Martin Krause, A New Balance on
Counterfeit Goods, TECH CENTRAL STATION, Aug. 22, 2005, http://www.techcentral
station.com/082105C.html.
64 See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Protecting Consumers from Counterfeit Drugs,
FDA CONSUMER MAG. (May-June 2004), http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/304-
drug.html. See also Douglas W. Steam, Deterring the Importation of Counterfeit
Pharmaceutical Products, 59 FOOD DRUG L.J. 537, 549-550 (2004) (discussing limited
criminal penalties and extensive complexity to prosecute illegal importers).
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time at all. 65 These weak penalties prompt drug counterfeiting, as
is the case in Latin America and the European Union.66
This combination has resulted in shifting illicit business
practices. Convicted cocaine traffickers have entered U.S.
markets selling not high margin, high-risk cocaine, but counterfeit
drugs. For example, Domingo Gonzalez and Julio Cruz led a
multi-million dollar counterfeit drug importation business. These
convicted cocaine traffickers moved into fake drug sales and sold
at least four million cholesterol medicine tablets and generated
more than $10 million in sales before they were caught. 67  As
shown in headlines such as "Former convicts try a safer venture:
Pharmaceuticals," it is easy to shift into the counterfeit medicines
trade.68
Other areas of the world suffer similar problems due to light
penalties that encourage exploitation of parallel trade loopholes to
introduce counterfeits. In the European Union, like the United
States and Latin America, penalties are light. For example, Allen
Valentine, the mastermind behind the U.K. counterfeit production
scheme that was producing and selling counterfeit products across
Europe, 69 had been convicted on fourteen previous occasions for
medication fraud; yet he only received a sentence of five and a
half years-and the sentence was due to his infringement of
intellectual property rights, rather than any threat to public
health. v More outrageously, it is possible that he will be released
65 See, e.g., L.A. Man Sentenced in Fake Viagra Case, MUSI.COM NEWS, May 17,
2005, http://news.muzi.com/news/ll/english/1363157.shtml?cc=20660&ccr= (perpetrator
caught smuggling and manufacturing counterfeit Viagra sentenced to six months home
detention and 2,500 hours community service).
66 As well as the United Kingdom and Asia. See infra notes 76-78 and
accompanying text.
67 See Todd, supra note 13. See also Cristina C. Birondo, Drive vs. Fake Drugs,
THE FREEMAN (Phil.), July 10, 2005, http://www.thefreeman.comlocal/story-20050710-
32228.html (describing Phillipines Councilor Arsenio Pacana warning that illicit drug
lords have moved into counterfeit drug production).
68 See Sally Kestin & Bob LaMendola, Former Convicts Try a Safer Venture:
Pharmaceuticals, SUN-SENTINEL, May 26, 2003, http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/sfl-
drugplayers26may26,0,2544492.story (outlining numerous cases of convicted felons
obtaining state licenses to distribute medications and selling counterfeit drugs).
69 See Lister, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
70 Id.
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in less than half that time; he is eligible for release in two years.71
The Valentine case follows several recalls and U.K. counterfeit
discoveries7 2 with similar light penalties for perpetrators, some
including no prison time at all.73
Asia is not immune to the light penalties in counterfeiting
drugs. Taiwan assessed the number of counterfeiting cases
brought to public prosecution and their attendant penalties. From
2003 to 2004, 137 cases of counterfeit drug importation and sale
were tried in Taiwan. Of all those cases, eighty-two resulted in
sentences of less than six months, and only one resulted in a
penalty of greater than two years.74
Around the world, domestic and international policy makers
fail to take counterfeit drug production seriously. It is no wonder
that trade in counterfeit drugs is burgeoning; low risk, low
penalties, and high profits create tempting opportunities for the
amoral businessperson.
D. Difficult Detection
Another facet driving the counterfeit drug trade is the limited
ability to detect the fake product. Trading counterfeit drugs may
be the perfect crime.75 Physicians and nurses generally fail to
71 Id.
72 Satchwell, supra note 20. Counterfeit Cialis and Reductil were detected in
August and September 2004. See MATTHEWS, supra note 20.
73 An individual found guilty of selling counterfeit Viagra worth £440,000 in the
United Kingdom was sentenced to 150 hours of community service and £1,250 in fines
by Isleworth Crown Court. See Bridget Carter, Man Caught Selling Fake Viagra
Escapes Jail Term, THE SCOTSMAN, June 24, 2005, http://news.scotsman.com/latest.
cfm?id=4738210.
74 Li-Ling Liu, Deputy Dir. Gen., Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs, Taiwan Dep't
of Health, Current Status of Anti-Counterfeiting in Chinese Taipei, Address at the 2005
Symposium of APEC Network: Pharmaceutical Regulatory Science (Nov. 14, 2005). It
should also be noted that in Taiwan, sentences can often be exchanged for payments to
the government in lieu of incarceration, resulting in no prison time required. Personal
communication with Oliver Yoa-Pu Hu, Ph.D., Dean of Research & Dev., Nat'l Def.
Med. Ctr., in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 14, 2005).
75 See Joel B. Finkelstein, Drug Reimportation Situation is Shifting as Canada
Could Cut Availability, Rx4US, Jan. 24, 2005, http://rx4us.com/en/prescription+drugs+
news/drug+reimportation+situation+is+shifting+as+canada+could+cut+availabiity.htm.
Note that counterfeiters have entered the medical device market, including fake surgical
supplies. See Medical Device Importer to Pay $10K Fine, SOUTH FLORIDA BUSINESS
JOURNAL, July 18, 2005,
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consider that therapeutic failure could be attributable to a fake
drug,76 instead ascribing poor patient outcomes to human
variation.77 Similarly, providers, patients, and families may be
unaware that they were victimized by a fake medicine, analogous
to patients dying without knowledge that their illness was in fact
treatable. 78 The patient's status may also limit any suspicion of the
presence of a fake drug; he or she may be frail, elderly, and/or
very ill, creating a tendency to believe the therapeutic failure or
death was associated with these characteristics rather than
treatment.
Detection is also limited by the lack of provider insight into
the source of drugs. Providers infrequently ask where the patient
purchased their medications; further, even in the rare event that
they do, patients may not wish to disclose to their providers that
medicines were purchased on the Internet or from a foreign
http://southflorida.bizjoumals.com/southflorida/stories/2005/07/1 8/daily50.html
(describing company convicted for introducing counterfeit surgical mesh into interstate
commerce).
76 A tragic case from China illustrates medical professionals' failure to consider the
existence of fake drugs. A six year old girl died after receiving a fake Hepatitis A
vaccine; physicians repeatedly assured the father that his daughter was fine even though
she exhibited clinically worsening signs, turned purple and blue, and foamed at the nose
and mouth. See Father Was Told Dying Daughter Was Fine After Illegal Vaccination,
RADIO FREE ASIA, July 22, 2005, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/social/2005/06/
29/chinavaccinations/.
77 For example, in one counterfeit case, only about ten percent of the fake drug was
ever recovered. Hence, nearly ninety percent of the counterfeit drug may have gone
undetected and been injected into 25,000 cancer and HIV patients. See Gilbert M. Gaul
& Mary Pat Flaherty, Lax System Allows Criminals to Invade the Supply Chain,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 22, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A61473
-20030ct21?language=printer. In some cases, the physician or nurse may assume the
patient is not being truthful when asked whether he or she is taking the drug
appropriately, and attribute therapeutic failure to patient noncompliance. In addition,
some fake drugs are made for asymptomatic clinical conditions such as high cholesterol
or hypertension, so any therapeutic effect or lack of thereof is not obvious. The placebo
effect may also result in clinical action, even though there is no active ingredient in the
drug. See Marv Shepard, Drug Equality, Safety Issues and Threats of Importation, 36
CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 77 (2005).
78 See, e.g., J. S. Gross, et al., Autopsy Study of the Elderly Institutionalized
Patient: Review of 234 Autopsies, 148(1) ARCHIVES INT. MED. 173 (1988) (describing
that treatable illnesses are under-diagnosed as determined by autopsy); B. Szende, et al.,
Accuracy of Admission and Clinical Diagnosis of Tumours as Revealed by 2000
Autopsies, 32A(7) EUR. J. CANCER 1102 (1996) (describing diagnostic error rate in tumor
related deaths verified by autopsy).
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country.
79
Other practical factors in the medication process contribute to
challenges in detecting counterfeit drugs. The medication
packaging is thrown away, making any investigation on that basis
unworkable. The suspect drug is metabolized by the patient's
body once taken, limiting the ability to detect the fake drug
ingested. Further, there are few laboratory screening tests
available to detect the thousands of drugs that patients could be
taking and drug levels are not easily obtained.8 °
There is little suspicion or discussion about counterfeits, and
evidence that might point to their presence is discarded or
digested.81  This situation creates a forensic quandary in efforts
to determine the presence and circumstances surrounding a
potential fake medicine; such difficulties are blocking effective
investigations in Canada associated with counterfeit drug deaths
79 This situation may be due to embarrassment or stigma associated with a
particular disease state or frustration with access to the care desired. See Jim Thompson,
Stigma? What Stigma?, EHI PRIMARY CARE, Sept. 6, 2005, http://www.ehiprimarycare.
com/comment and analysis/index.cfm?ID= 100.
80 Note also that if the drug is a suspected fake, determination of its authenticity is
difficult. Drug tests for the legitimate drug may not be available; if they are, one has to
know what fake material to test for-a daunting task with the tremendously diverse array
of substances used to create counterfeit drugs.
81 Even well-known cases where information and the fake materials are available
for analysis present challenges to any investigation and prosecution. Governments may
also attempt to suppress information about counterfeits, through measures such as false
certification of the drugs, creating significant barriers to detection. See Cockburn et al.,
supra note 10, at 1-2. Industry, because of fears that legitimate drug sales would be
adversely affected, may not provide broad information about detection and scope of
counterfeits. Id. at 2. Further, physicians and government officials may be part of the
illegal activity. See 12 Doctors Involved in Spreading of Fake Drugs, SUN STAR, Aug.
21, 2005, http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/pan/2005/08/3 1/news/1 2.doctors.involved.in.
spreading.of.fake.drugs.health.office.html.
A related issue is that physicians have little tendency to discuss issues of
medication costs with patients, resulting in no substantive discussion of where to obtain
legitimate drugs for the best price. See G.C. Alexander et al., Physician Strategies to
Reduce Patients' Out-of-Pocket Prescription Costs, 165(6) ARCHIVES INT. MED. 633
(2005). There are, in fact, available means by which physicians and others can educate
patients regarding lower prices for drugs. See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang & Stephen H.
Carson, A Physician's Guide to Helping Patients Obtain Medication Savings, SAN DIEGO
PHYSICIAN, May 2005, at 23; see also Partnership for Safe Medicines, Safe Savings
Brochure, http://www.safemedicines.org; Partnership for Prescription Assistance,
http://www.pprx.org.
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It should also be noted that detection is difficult because of
the quality of the packaging and counterfeit product itself.
Counterfeiters often have highly developed tools, and the fake
creation appears identical to the actual medicine in both its
packaging and the substantive product itself. A former detective
superintendent and former Association of Chief Police Officers'
spokesperson on counterfeiting, in testimony for the Senate
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions committee, noted that:
counterfeit medicines often appear so like the genuine product
that no one, not the best specialist can tell the genuine packaging
from the counterfeit. And no one, not the best specialist can tell
the genuine product from the counterfeit unless the product is
subjected to chemical analysis. The result is that everyone,
poor, ignorant, rich and smart, all are at risk from counterfeit or
sub-standard products-and they probably won't recogni[z]e
them when they and if they see them....
In the course of my work I have myself negotiated to buy
counterfeit medicines from China, Germany, Poland, India,
Pakistan and other countries. It is extremely easy for anyone to
find a foreign party willing to counterfeit medicines (without
active ingredients) and present those medicines in packaging
that will easily pass as genuine.83
Hence, the limited suspicion and detection ability, even by
experts in the field, provides fertile ground for those who would
manufacture and sell counterfeit medicines to an ignorant public.
V. The Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act
Congressional efforts have been made to allow parallel
importation into the United States. The major drug importation
bill from the 109th Congress is the Pharmaceutical Market Access
82 See Luma Muhtadie, Fake-drug Case: Huge Forensic Challenges, HAMILTON
SPECTATOR, July 16, 2005, at AO1 (describing investigations into seven deaths associated
with suspected counterfeit drugs, which "[are] definitely going to be a major forensic
challenge").
83 Top European Security Expert Warns Senate Panel, supra note 22. This ease of
packaging manufacture has been exploited domestically by gangs as well. See, e.g.,
Alison Gendar, A sick Rx for Riches: Medicaid Pills Bought & Resold to Drug Stores,
NY DAILY NEWS, Oct. 4, 2005, http://www.nydailynews.com/front/story/352354p-
300455c.html.
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and Drug Safety Act of 2005, introduced by Senator Byron
Dorgan. 4  This bill proposed to amend the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act85  to permit both commercial and personal
importation of prescription drugs.
A. General
Under the bill, the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services would promulgate regulations allowing
importation through registered exporters and registered importers
from a potentially expanding number of countries. Personal
importation of drugs would be permissible while regulations
regarding a commercial importation system are written. In an
effort to prevent drug manufacturers from penalizing or limiting
sales to foreign suppliers participating in the commercial
importation program,86 federal precedent currently holding that
foreign sale of a product does not exhaust the domestic patent and
intellectual property protections would be overruled.87
84 S. 334, 109th Cong. (2005), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=109_cong.bills&docid=f:s334is.txt.pdf. Co-sponsors included Sens. Snowe,
Grassley, Kennedy, McCain, Stabenow, Chafee, Jeffords, Lott, Dayton, Clinton,
Bingaman, Boxer, Conrad, Durbin, Feingold, Feinstein, Inouye, Johnson, Kohl, Leahy,
Levin, Nelson of Florida, Obama, Pryor, Salazar, Sarbanes, Schumer, and Collins. The
Dorgan bill has bipartisan support and the most co-sponsors, making it the leading
legislative vehicle. Note that there have actually been federal laws allowing importation.
In 2000, the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act, 21 U.S.C. §284 (2000) was passed,
which would allow drug importation in the effort to reduce medication prices. However,
then-Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, de-
implemented the statute. Under §384(l)(1), Secretary Shalala was empowered to do so if
she could not certify that implementation of bill would "pose no additional risk to the
public's health and safety." Id. Due to the inability of the Secretary to do so, the bill's
importation provision was decertified. In addition, the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2087
(2003), superceded the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act, and allowed for
importation from Canada, again only if the Secretary could certify no additional risk to
the public's health and safety. No such certification has been made. Id.
The Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. REP. NO. 108-231
(2004), the Safe IMPORT Act of 2004, S. REP. NO. 334 (2004), and the Pharmaceutical
Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2004, S. REP. NO. 2328 (2004), are other recent
but failed efforts to allow parallel drug importation. The latter bill is virtually identical
to S. 334.
85 21 U.S.C. §§381-804.
86 15 U.S.C. §§12-805.
87 See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm., 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert.
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B. Safety Issues: Permitted Countries
The bill's provisions raise significant safety concerns that stem
from other parallel importation experiences.88 Personal and
commercial importation would be allowed from Canada, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, as well as other countries in
the European Union.89 Yet many of these countries are subject to
and suffer from counterfeit problems themselves, particularly the
European Union.9° Other countries may be added to the list of
denied, 536 U.S. 950 (2001). Note that foreign sale of "gray market" veterinary drugs to
U.S. consumers via Europe has consistently been held to be in violation of intellectual
property rights. See, e.g., Judge Lynch, British Firm Enjoined From Selling 'Gray
Market' Pet Medicines to U.S. Consumers Via Internet, NEW YORK L.J., July 25, 2005,
at 22.
88 Members of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee also
had safety concerns within the bill. Sen. Gregg, former Committee chairman,
"challenged [Sens. Dorgan, Stabenow, Snowe, and Vitter] on their legislation, saying it
would make too many changes to existing food and drug law." Kate Schuler, Drug
Reimportation Hearing Allows Sen. Enzi to Drop Hints on Possible Legislation, CQ
TODAY, Apr. 19, 2005, at 12. "In a heated exchange with Snowe, Gregg pressed the
issue of safety and grilled her on the changes that the bill would make to the current
FDA inspection and approval system. 'We have a system that works,' Gregg said. 'To
stop into this area requires that we do it correctly, and I have serious reservations' about
the bill." Id. at 12. Other experts were concerned about its provisions. According to
Graham Satchwell, a noted expert on pharmaceutical fraud in Europe, the bill would "not
afford your citizens the protections they currently enjoy. As it stands, S.334 does not
afford confidence that a drug from a 'permitted country' will have originated there or
have been subject to appropriate regulation." Top European Security Expert Warns
Senate Panel, supra note 22.
89 See S. 334, supra note 84, at 9-10.
90 See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text (discussing EU problems with
counterfeit drugs). Countries that would immediately be allowed to provide imported
drugs under the bill's provisions would include Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Some of these countries have encountered significant problems with counterfeits. See id.
Indeed, testimony by John Theriault, Vice President for Global Security, Pfizer, Inc.,
before the Drug Importation Task Force noted that:
"[w]ith the exception of Italy and Luxembourg, counterfeit Pfizer products were
found in each of the EU member countries, as well as in eight of the fifteen
candidate countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, and Turkey). Austria. Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland and South Africa are also among the countries where counterfeit
Pfizer products were detected. Seizures in the Asia-Pacific region included
counterfeit packaging not for the local markets, but for those in the U.S. and
Australia."
[Vol. 31
2006] COUNTERFEIT DRUGS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
permitted traders if those countries have laws on the books that
include a review of drug safety and efficacy, good manufacturing
processes, adverse event alert mechanisms, and labeling and
promotion rules. 9' Unfortunately, countries may fulfill these
requirements in form but not implement them in substance. 92
C. Inadequate Resources
It should be noted that, beyond other countries' difficulties in
enforcing safety standards, the FDA in the United States has been
criticized for inadequate safety and public health activities. This
includes the Vioxx withdrawal, which was initiated by Merck, the
manufacturer, and not ordered by the FDA;93 problems associated
with antidepressant use in children; as well as counterfeit drugs.94
A root cause of this problem is that the FDA is chronically
underfunded. Unfortunately, this circumstance leads to good faith
FDA personnel having to make uncomfortable choices as to which
safety policies to enforce. 95 This reality indicates that the U.S.
John Theriault, Testimony Before the Drug Importation Task Force (Apr. 5, 2004), at 3,
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04nO 115/04n-01 15-ts00062-Pfizer.pdf.
91 See S.334, supra note 84, at 10-11.
92 For example, Russia is a country that fulfills this provision, as may China and
India-countries that have legitimate pharmaceutical industries, but are well known for
their counterfeit drug production. See, e.g., Moscow Police Bust Counterfeit Medicine
Factory, Moscow NEWS, July 12, 2005, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/07/12/
falsedrugs.shtml (describing Moscow police bust of counterfeit medications which were
sold in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other regions).
93 See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang, Flaws in the U.S. Drug-Safety System, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIBUNE, Nov. 29, 2004, at B7, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/
20041129/newslzle29liang.html; see also Vioxx concerns spawn new FDA drug safety
board, NEWSTARGET, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.newstarget.com005048.html.
94 See infra note 162 and accompanying text (noting the FDA released counterfeit
Sidenafil (Viagra)).
95 See, e.g., Charles Marwick, FDA Funding Problems Imperil Safety of Biological
Products in the United States, 279 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 899 (1998); Arthur A. Levin, The
FDA, Politics, and Public Protection, CENTER FOR MEDICAL CONSUMERS, (Nov. & Dec.
2002), http://www.medicalconsumers.org/pages/science-underattack.html ("User fees
also have provided Congress with cover for their historic under-funding of the FDA.
The result is that the agency cannot adequately carry out many of the public protection
duties that Congress has assigned it."); Mark D. Uehling, A New Drug Safety Database
for Pharma, FDA, ITWORLD.COM, May 17, 2005, http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/
industry/healthcare/article.cfm?articleid=5713&EID=0 ("Congress chronically under-
fund[s] the FDA's MedWatch drug safety program").
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drug safety system has significant resource challenges to
monitoring domestic drug safety. This makes it highly unlikely
that the FDA could incur greater responsibilities for the security
and safety of pharmaceuticals where it would have to monitor
domestic supplies as well as inspect and monitor other countries'
systems that may be, in practice, only existent on paper and not in
reality.
Limited regulatory resources would also impact the mandates
for registration requirements for importers and exporters under the
proposed legislation. Under the bill, importers and exporters are
required to register with the Department of Health and Human
Services.96 Registration requirements are extensive, and include
place of business, warehouse locations, and locations of other
related facilities.97 In addition, the bill mandates that information
regarding the source of imported drugs, as well as a promise that
the registrant will not import or export drugs that do not qualify
under the bill, are also to be documented by the Department of
Health and Human Services for each importer or exporter.98 The
Secretary must act within ninety days to approve or deny the
registration application.99
Such administrative requirements seem onerous for the FDA
given its current resources as well as its expanded safety mandates
and responsibilities under the bill. Indeed, verifying all registrant
information domestically as well as internationally, sources of
proposed drugs for export/import, and other critical characteristics
of the exporters and importers under a ninety day time constraint
is virtually impossible. As such, important components of the
safety structure would not be attended to, and would likely be
within the set of mandates unfulfilled and unenforced by the FDA.
D. Pedigree Limitations
To ensure the safety of parallel imported drugs, the bill
requires that the drugs be accompanied by a paper pedigree
statement indicating their chain of custody.'0° Yet when one notes
96 See S.334, supra note 84, at 12-13.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 13-14.
99 See id. at 18.
100 "(3) The exporter or importer obtained the drug-(B) directly from an entity
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drug counterfeiters' talents in creating realistic holograms,
package inserts, and the drugs themselves, creating reasonable
fake pedigree documentation would not appear to be an effective
deterrent.' 10  Further, due to limited resources and because
inspection and verification require significant time, energy, and
expertise, checking pedigree papers may not be an administrative
priority.
In addition, the bill relies on contractual agreements between
parallel trading partners to police validity of papers, not criminal
law. 10 2  Hence, to keep traders honest, the bill contemplates
breach of contract actions to ensure pedigree accountability.
Unfortunately, in the world of counterfeit drugs, there is a criminal
element that must be considered. A potential civil suit by
legitimate business entities would provide no incentive for the
manufacturer and seller of fake drugs to change its behavior,
assuming it is ever caught.
It should be noted that there are provisions within the bill that
require foreign exporters to subject themselves to inspections,
including determination of pedigree. 103  The Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services may assign one or
more employees to this inspection; 4 under the bill, these
inspections must be performed by the FDA °5 at least twelve times
annually.16
The practicality of these pedigree inspections is limited by
resources. It is difficult to see how all these facilities will be
inspected at least once a month; recall that facilities that can range
that, by contract with the exporter or importer-(i) provides to the exporter or importer a
statement ... that, for the chain of custody from the establishment, identifies each prior
sale, purchase, or trade of the drug ...." See id. at 23.
101 See Robb Miller, Tracking Papers Won't Help, USA TODAY, May 31, 2005, at
A12 (indicating pedigree papers are easily forged, would impose high costs, and may
result paradoxically in a false sense of security since they can be used to "wash"
products to make them appear legitimate).
102 See S.334, supra note 84, at 24.
103 See id. at 25. The duty of the Secretary of Department of Health and Human
Services is to inspect and verify chain of custody. Id. at 31.
104 See id. at 26.
105 The FDA would be responsible for these activities, since it would receive fees
from registrants participating in the program. See id. at 36, 41.
106 See id. at 27.
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from Australia to Japan to Latvia. More inspectors would
necessarily need to be hired to fulfill this provision of the bill
alone. The FDA has only 16.9 full-time equivalent inspectors for
all of the international mail facilities in the United States.
10 7
Current levels of resources and staffing would be completely
inadequate to verify the quality and pedigree of the hundreds to
thousands of exporters that would participate under the bill's
provisions.
10 8
E. Pre-Import Information Collection
The proposed legislation mandates that pre-importation notice
be given to the relevant governmental agency "not less than eight
hours and not more than five days in advance of the time of the
importation of a shipment of qualifying drugs." 109  The
information required under the proposed bill includes:
" the name and complete contact information of the person
submitting the notice;
" the name and complete contact information of the importer
involved;
" the identity of the drug, including the established name of
the drug, the quantity of the drug, and the lot number
assigned by the manufacturer;
" the identity of the manufacturer of the drug, including the
identity of the establishment at which the drug was
manufactured;
" the country from which the drug is shipped;
" the name and complete contact information for the shipper
of the drug;
" anticipated arrival information, including the port of arrival
and crossing location within that port, and the date and
107 TASK FORCE, supra note 2 at 56, Figure 5.3. Note that inspecting imported
medicines is not these employees' only duty.
108 Note that the number of inspections of registered exporters in the first year
would be a minimum of 600 (twelve inspections a year with a minimum of fifty), see
S.334, supra note 84, at 92, and for the second year, a minimum of 1,200 (twelve
inspections a year with a minimum of 100); the number of importers would be even
greater, with at least 1,200 the first year (twelve inspections a year with a minimum of
100), and at least 2,400 the second year (twelve inspections a year with a minimum of
200). See id. at 93-94.
109 See id. at 28-29.
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time;
" a summary of the chain of custody of the drug from the
establishment in which the drug was manufactured to the
importer;
" a declaration as to whether the Secretary has ordered that
importation of the drug from the permitted country cease
under subsection (g)(2)(C) or (D); and
" such other information as the Secretary may require by
regulation." 0
This breadth of information would require a new infrastructure
just to collect and collate the information; verification would
require even more resources. Once again, limited resources may
lead to a lack of enforcement, or the draining of scarce resources
from direct safety-related efforts.
F. Funding
To pay for its provisions, the bill requires importers"' and
exporters' 12 to pay a registration fee and an inspection fee.
However, this arrangement represents financial underwriting of
government scrutiny by those to be scrutinized, creating at least
the appearance of a conflict of interest.
The bill's contemplated funding mechanism is similar to
pharmaceutical drug application user fees paid to the FDA. Many
sources have criticized this practice. 13 Hence, for importers and
exporters who fund their own review process, a similar appearance
of impropriety arises. Such a system may subject the FDA to
Congressional budget cuts and conflict of interest charges since it
will be the primary beneficiary of these fees under the proposed
110 See id. at 29-30.
111 See id. at 32.
112 See id. at 37.
113 See, e.g., Phil B. Fontanarosa, et al., Postmarketing Surveillance-Lack of
Vigilance, Lack of Trust, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2647 (2004); Gary W. Lawson, FDA
Dependence on Drug Industry (letter to the editor), 97 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 1039 (2005);
Marcia Angell, What Ails the FDA? Payola, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2005,
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial-opinion/oped/articles/2005/03/1 0/what ails
_theJdapayola/; Alexandra Marks, How Drug-Approval Woes Crept up on FDA:
Critics Charge Conflict of Interest in a System Where Pharmaceutical Giants Fund the
Regulatory Process, CHImsTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2004, http://www.csmonitor.
com/2004/1126/pO2sO I-uspo.html.
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legislation." 4 Therefore, this kind of approach, which has raised
potential safety concerns in other pharmaceutical contexts, is
inappropriate to ensure the safety of the medicine supply under a
parallel importation regime." 5
G. Bioequivalence and Excipients
The bill would permit non-bioequivalent drug versions to be
imported into the United States." 6 Non-bioequivalent drug forms
generally include different excipients; excipients are the non-
therapeutic materials within the drug."'
As a clinical matter, it is well-known that different excipients
create risks of adverse drug reactions." 8 In fact, the FDA has
noted that excipients can be toxicants, with adverse reactions
including renal failure, osmotic diarrhea, hypersensitivity
reactions, cardiotoxicity, and death." 9 Domestically in the United
States, even drug forms deemed bioequivalent by the FDA have
nevertheless resulted in adverse drug reactions. 20
If parallel trade is permitted as contemplated by the bill, the
international definition of "bioequivalent" will be crucial to ensure
the safety in medicine supplies. Unfortunately, international
114 S.334, supra note 84, at 36. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
would be an optional beneficiary of such fees. Id.
115 See Fontanarosa et al., supra note 113.
116 S.334, supra note 84, at 61-63.
117 See Thomas A. Wheatley, What Are Excipients? EXCIPIENT ToxICTY AND
SAFETY (Myra L. Weinger & Lois A. Kotkoskie eds., 1999).
118 M. J. Akers, Excipient-drug Interactions in Parenteral Formulations, 91 J.
PHARM. Sci. 2283 (2002); P. Baldrick, Pharmaceutical Excipient Development: The Need
for Preclinical Guidance, 32 REGUL. TOXICOL. PHARMACOL. 210 (2000); L. K. Golightly,
et al., Pharmaceutical Excipients: Adverse Effects Associated with Inactive Ingredients
in Drug Products (Part 1), 3(2) MED. ToxICOL. ADVERSE DRUG EXP. 128 (1988); G.
Pifferi, et al., Quality and Functionality of Excipients, 54 FARMACO 1 (1999). See, e.g.,
Y. L. Wong, Adverse Effects of Pharmaceutical Excipients in Drug Therapy, 22(1) ANN.
ACAD. MED. SINGAPORE 99 (1993).
119 See R. E. Osterberg & N. A. See, Toxicity of Excipients-A Food and Drug
Administration Perspective, 22 INT'L J. TOXICOL. 377 (2003).
120 See Mark D. Grebenau, URGENT: Reports of Substitution of NEORAL with
Generic Equivalents of SANDIMMUNE, Novartis Dear Healthcare Provider Letter,
http://www.novartis-transplant.com/medpro/drug-substitution.jsp (describing that one
form of a transplant drug described by the FDA as therapeutically equivalent was in fact
not equivalent to the other form).
[Vol. 31
COUNTERFEIT DRUGS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
definitions, including those used in the European Union and Latin
America, are not harmonized. 21  This situation will create
significant conflicts and raise legal issues associated with
imported purportedly bioequivalent versus non-bioequivalent drug
imports. 122 More importantly, patient care is jeopardized. Hence,
under the bill's provisions, if two drugs are labeled bioequivalent
when their excipients are not, the drugs are not bioequivalent and
adverse reactions may occur. Investigating their causes may
become an exceedingly complicated endeavor requiring significant
time and resources and subjecting more patients to harm in the
interim.
H. Intellectual Property Changes
The bill attempts to preempt efforts by pharmaceutical
companies to act against entities wishing to participate in the
parallel trade program.123 Under the bill's provisions, pharmaceutical
companies would be mandated to sell under the same conditions to
all suppliers, regardless of whether the seller participates in the
parallel trade of drugs into the United States. The bill also
requires that all drugs be the same in form and in packaging; this
provision is to prevent manufacturers from determining whether
drugs were intended for distribution in the United States or a
foreign country.'24 Further, under the bill, resale of a drug sold for
121 Bioequivalent, or, as it is known in the European Union, "essentially similar"
medicines, are often not defined within regions. See, e.g., Trevor Cook, Regulatory
Data Collection of Medicinal Products in Europe, BIo-SCIENCE L. REv. (Mar. 6,
2003), http://pharmalicensing.com/features/disp/1046957520_3e674dd06906d (European
definition of "essentially similar" is absent under EU directives, or is established by each
independent regulatory authority); Ndria Homedes, et al., Generic Drug Policies in Latin
America, HEALTH, NUTRITION, AND POPULATION DISCUSSION PAPER, WORLD BANK (Mar.
2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/
Resources/281627-1095698140167/HomedesGenericDrugFinal.pdf (describing a survey
study discovering that bioequivalence has different meanings across Latin American
countries).
122 This will include warning labeling. See S.334, supra note 84, at 61-63. Note
also that individual importation would also be allowed if non-bioequivalent labeling is
provided. See id. at 62. Yet this is a highly dangerous action; if excipients make the
drug version a poor choice for the patient, the drug actually is a different formulation, or
the patient discovers the non-bioequivalence and decides not to take the drug, significant
negative therapeutic consequences can result.
123 See id. at 73-74.
124 See id. at 75.
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or to a foreign entity which is then brought into the United States
for parallel sale is not an act of patent infringement.'25
Such provisions are included in the bill to prevent gaming of
U.S. intellectual property laws in an effort to stop the parallel
importation program. Current federal law permits such suits.'26
These proposed changes could potentially limit pharmaceutical
company gaming, yet they may also prevent companies from
protecting the public-and protecting the company from potential
lawsuits-by refusing to sell to unreliable or criminal actors.
Because many companies have their own investigative units, they
may identify certain suspect business entities. Even if such
entities are identified, so long as they are registrants under the
parallel importation program, the proposed statute mandates that
they cannot be discriminated against, and therefore they must be
sold to under standard conditions. This situation may result in the
risk of pecuniary and nonpecuniary harm to the pharmaceutical
company as well as the patient if fakes are introduced through the
parallel trade stream.
L Security
The bill attempts to provide protections against patient harm
through mandated security measures. The bill specifies that track
and trace as well as other anti-counterfeiting technology must be
established through regulation by the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services 127 within ninety days from
enactment of the statute. 128
However, drug safety technology is not currently advanced
enough to ensure security of the drug supply. The FDA notes that
radio-frequency identification (RFID), a primarily advocated
system, as well as other technology, is at present undeveloped and
will probably not be ready for implementation until at least
2007.129 Further, pilot testing of RFID found a twenty-seven
125 See id. at 89.
126 See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm., 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 536 U.S. 950 (2002).
127 See S.334, supra note 84, at 108-09.
128 See id. at 110.
129 Of course, this only relates to initial use of the technology. FDA Announces New
Initiative to Protect the U.S. Drug Supply Through the Use of Radiofrequency
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percent failure rate. 3 ° For large wholesalers with more than 1.39
million deliveries a day,131 this failure rate is unacceptable. It also
shows that a ninety-day implementation window is unrealistic and
untenable from government, patient, and private industry
standpoints.
An industry spokesman indicated that, "RFID is great for
tracking cardboard. But to get to actual medicine safety, much
more needs to be done."'132  Others in Congressional testimony
have noted the significant drug security problems that focusing
upon tracking packaging:
New anti-counterfeiting technologies have numerous
shortcomings including the following:
* In almost every case, the technology, be it a hologram,
tamper proof labels, embossing, thermo-reactive ink, RFID
tags, DNA markers, and the like, enable companies to track
cardboard, not product. It is not unusual to find genuine
product in counterfeit packaging and counterfeit product in
genuine packaging.
" In the United States and in the European Union, the two
largest pharmaceutical markets in the world, repackaging is
legal; thus, without violation of any law, packaging, with all
types of expensive, state of the art secure devices, can end up
in the trash or worse, in the hands of a counterfeiter, while
Idetification Technology, FDA NEWS, Nov. 15, 2004, http://www.fda.govbbs/topics/
news/2004/NEWOI 133.html.
130 Robert P. Giacalone, Drug Wholesaling and Importation: Challenges and
Opportunities? 1st Annual San Diego Health Policy Conference, June 3, 2005 (noting
that Cardinal Health, one of the three major drug wholesalers distributors in the United
States, found upon testing that only seventy-three percent of RFID tags were readable,
and that broader testing found that wholesalers had failure rates of three and a half
percent to twenty-one percent). The immaturity of RFID can be illustrated by a major
event in the RFID track and trace pharmaceutical effort. This was a pilot project
announced by a single drug manufacturer, a single wholesaler (not one of the "big
three"), and a single technology company, for only one drug. See, e.g., SupplyScape and
Unisys Pilot Pharmaceutical Industry's First Electronic Pedigree System for
Commercial Drugs, BUSINESS WIRE, May 31, 2005, http://www.unisys.conabout-
unisys/news_a_events/05318546.htm. It is conceivable that the costs associated with
such projects will be exceedingly high, given capital costs that will be required to
implement the program, including different wholesalers for different drug manufacturers,
for different drugs.
131 Giacalone, supra note 130.
132 Id.
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genuine product is legally distributed in packaging with no
security features.
" RFID technology which was featured in a FDA task force
report is more of an inventory management tool than an anti-
counterfeiting device.
" A counterfeiter or diverter could purchase RFID tags and
attempt to mimic manufacturers' RFID codes.
" Industries which have and are using RFID products have
noted that when their products enter the 'grey market,' their
RFID tags are often 'zapped' rendering them unreadable.
" Counterfeiters generally deal, not only with counterfeit
product, but with diverted, expired, and stolen product as
well. Envision the scenario where a counterfeiter steals
product, removes genuine product from the 'secure
packages', and then puts the counterfeit product in these
packages, and then reinserts the counterfeit product back into
the system. The counterfeit product would pass through all
the readers successfully. What then happens to the genuine
product? The irony is that the genuine product would most
likely be repackaged in counterfeit packaging with
unreadable tags and entered into the distribution system. If
the RFID system works correctly, the genuine product would
be kicked out of the system, but later determined to be
genuine, undermining any confidence in the system. 
133
133 Testimony of James Christian, House Committee on Energy and Commerce:
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Product Counterfeiting:
How Fakes Are Undermining U.S. Jobs, Innovation, and Consumer Safety, June 15,
2005, http://energycommerce.house.gov/I08/Hearings/06152005hearing 155 1/Christian.
pdf; see also J. Alan Coates, FDA's Placebo for Counterfeit Drugs, Fraud Prevention
Institute, http://www.fraudpreventioninstitute.org/FakePillsArticle.pdf. Coates notes that
"The FDA's recent decision to use radio tags to track drug shipments from manufacturer
to major wholesalers may dampen diversion of legitimate drugs. However, the real
threat is not legitimate-but counterfeit drugs." Note many in the industry still question
the business case for RFID and the manufacturing benefits; further, Europe lags in
adoption. See Survey: What's the Value of RFID/EPC? Sept. 2004, http://www.pack
world.com/articles/RelatedArticles/18118.html (reporting that survey of manufacturing
representatives indicate RFID benefits unclear to two-thirds of survey participants); see
also Half of Manufacturing Executives Expect High Return on RFID Investment, Bus.
WIRE, http://www.tmcnet.comlusubmit/2004/Jun/1045874.htm (finding only three percent
of respondents indicating they will be rolling out RFID implementations).
Industry specialists note other implementation challenges. These include
industry agreement on a rollout timetable, technology standards, RFID tag and reader
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As a result of these significant drug safety problems,
technological tools are being developed for drug supply
security,134 but broader and robust application and reliability have
not yet been established. Any reliance on technology as a panacea
for ensuring safety and security of the drug supply is sorely
misplaced.
J. Internet Regulation
The bill does attempt to regulate Internet pharmacies, but
regulating the irregular and offshore nature of Internet businesses
presents tremendous challenges, not the least of which is
regulating the quality of drugs sold. Congress has repeatedly
voiced its concerns regarding the situation:
For the past 15 years, the Committee on Energy and Commerce
has been actively investigating a range of issues related to the
sale and distribution of prescription drugs entering into the
United States from foreign sources. As part of this effort, we
have directed minority staff to visit various border crossings,
international mail-branch facilities, and major consignment
carriers to examine the types and amounts of unapproved
prescription drugs entering the United States. In particular,
these hearings have extensively examined the problem of rogue
Internet pharmacies and how the drugs sold on these Web sites
enter the U.S. through the U.S. international mail facilities and
express consignment carriers, such as FedEx, UPS, and DHL.
Through these hearings and repeated correspondence, we
have provided extensive input into how and why current policies
availability, and agreements and ownership of data and on data sharing. See Kontnik,
supra note 12. Further, countries such as Russia, with a large counterfeits problem, note
that security systems will have little effect due to counterfeiter ability to mimic security
systems as well. See, e.g., Fake Medications Inundate the Russian Pharmaceutical
Market: The Russian Experience in Introducing Special Marks for Licensed Video and
Audio Production Has Not Resulted in Any Positive Changes, PRAVDA, May 4, 2005,
http://english.Pravda.rumainl18/89/357/15406-medicine.html.
134 For example, molecular tracers that provide access to flexible as well as rigid
plastics are progressing. However, this still only follows packaging rather than
product. See Molecular Tracer Tags Rigid, Flexible Packaging, in
PHARMATECHNOLOGIST, July 27, 2005, http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/news/
news-ng.asp?n=61564-molecular-tracer-tags; Tracey Boles, Scanner Will Fight $6bn
Counterfeit Medicines Market, BUSINESS ONLINE UK, Sept. 25, 2005, http://www.the
businessonline.com/Stories.aspx?StorylD=-A7F19D68-049D-4EB6-894A-0E7657B l8CE1 &
SectionlD=F3B76EFO-7991-4389-B72E-DO7EB5AA 1CEE.
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adopted by key agencies responsible for combating this
problem-namely, the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (Customs), and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)-are ineffective .... It remains clear to
us that the unabated flow of unregulated drugs entering the U.S.
poses a growing threat to the Nation's public health. The nature
of online pharmacies and the inability of key agencies to provide
even rudimentary controls over rogue Internet pharmacies is
producing measurable harm. For example, it is likely that at
least some of the unregulated drug flow that we have
documented entering the U.S. from foreign sources is finding its
way into the wholesale chain, and even onto pharmacy shelves..
Our investigation has repeatedly demonstrated the ease at
which foreign-purchased prescription drugs can enter the U.S.
with the click of a mouse, and anybody who has visited an
international U.S. mail facility would understand that the
Internet is the source of many of these drugs....
[T]he volume of [shipments of controlled substances] were
overwhelming all efforts to adequately process or deny entry to
the bulk of these drugs. While Customs and the FDA were
making some attempts to stop a portion of these drugs (mostly
the controlled substances), after the purposeful release of
hundreds of packages of counterfeit Sidenafil [Viagra], it
became evident through visits to other mail facilities that the
entire screening system had collapsed. In short, the system used
by Customs and FDA was no longer capable of addressing this
problem. 135
The bill's provisions attempt to utilize the Federation of State
Medical Boards' National Clearinghouse on Internet Prescribing
as the guardian of safety for Internet pharmacies. Yet, such
reliance is misplaced; first, the Federation of State Medical Boards
had no knowledge of its role; second, its clearinghouse is focused
on monitoring unethical physician prescribing practices, not
135 Letter to The Honorable Michael 0. Leavitt, Secretary, Department of Health
and Human Services from John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and
Commerce and Bart Stupak, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
July 20, 2005, http://www.house.gov/commerce-democrats/Press_109/1091tr29.pdf.
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identifying suspect Internet pharmacies.13 6
VI. Policy Efforts
Any attempt at parallel trade in pharmaceuticals in the United
States must be preceded by significant attention to a wide array of
factors in order to ensure the safety of the pharmaceutical supply.
An interdisciplinary public policy is essential to adequately ensure
sound control of medicines entering the country now, before any
potentially harmful parallel trade is allowed. At a minimum, a
four-part strategy must be coordinated involving public health
efforts, an integrated reporting system, penal reform, and
investment in technology prior to the introduction of any broad-
based parallel importation scheme into the United States.
A. Public Health Campaign
Any influx of counterfeit drugs, particularly through illicit
parallel importation such as Internet sales, is a public health risk.
As such, public health efforts must be part of the policy that
protects citizens from harm associated with tainted or fake
medicines.
Like other public health issues such as obesity and cigarette
smoking, policy solutions must be interdisciplinary and
aggressive.'37 For potential counterfeit drugs, the first step is to
raise awareness among patients. A public health campaign with
dramatic advertisements and messages would be appropriate. For
example, the International Nurses Day of 2005 was focused upon
the problem of counterfeit drugs. 138 It included posters indicating
that "Counterfeits Kill" distributed in clinics and facilities around
the world; with twelve million nurses represented, such a
campaign has the potential for significant public health impact. 1
39
136 The author at a Federation of State Medical Boards Patient Safety Task Force
meeting notified the Federation of State Medical Boards representatives, including its
President and Vice President for Legislative Affairs, about the Federation's program
inclusion in S.334. Personal Communication with Jim Thompson, MD, President, and
Lisa Robin, Vice President, Federation of State Medical Boards (May 12, 2005).
137 See Lisa Smith & Bryan A. Liang, Childhood Obesity: A Public Health Problem
Requiring a Policy Solution, 9(1) JOURNAL OF MEDICINE & LAW 37 (2005).
138 INT'L COUNCIL OF NURSES, COUNTERFEITS KILL: NURSES TARGET COUNTERFEIT
MEDICINES (2005), http://www.icn.ch/indkit2005.htm.
139 See International Council of Nurses, International Nurses Day, May 12, 2005,
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Patients may also benefit from broad dissemination of simple
consumer education cards. Checklists such as the SAFE DRUG
checklist, available from the Partnership for Safe Medicines, are a
step in the right direction. 140
Public health campaigns should also include public service
messages broadcast through television and print media outlets. Ad
Council efforts as well as prominent displays in high circulation
magazines and newspapers of general interest are essential to raise
awareness among consumers of the risks of fake or tainted
medicines.
A public health campaign should also incorporate healthcare
providers such as physicians and nurses. If physicians and nurses
are not currently aware of the risks associated with counterfeit
drugs, they may attribute therapeutic failure to human variation or
patients dissembling about the source of their medicines. 4 ' This
lack of awareness derives from issues of parallel trade, since
physicians and nurses generally do not ask where patients obtained
their medications. 142  Some efforts have been made to question
patients in this regard by the International Council of Nurses and
use of the SAFE DRUG checklist that has been developed and
distributed to nurses on a small scale in the United States.143
http://www.icn.ch/indkit.htm. Unfortunately, although the International Council of
Nurses represents nurses from around the world, the U.S. contingent generally does not
participate. Personal Communication with Linda Carrier-Walker, Int'l Council of
Nurses Dir. of Commc'n and External Relations (Oct. 17, 2005). Indeed, International
Nurses Day was not recognized or celebrated in the United States.
140 SAFE DRUG Checklist, http://www.safemedicines.org/resources/SAFEDRUG.
pdf. To protect oneself against the potential for counterfeit drugs, patients should
consider using samples, assessing drug Appearance, noting the body's feeling after
taking the drug, evaluating one's response, contacting one's doctor if a suspected fake
drug is detected, reporting any potential fake drug to the FDA and other regulatory
agencies, making the drug unavailable so it will not be confused with legitimate forms,
and gathering relevant information about the suspect drug for investigation. Id.
141 See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying texts (discussing additional concerns
regarding detection).
142 Id. Even if patients are asked by providers, they may be reluctant to disclose the
source if it is from the Internet, an over-the-border sale, or other non-traditional source.
Id.
143 Partnership for Safe Medicines-Nursing SAFE DRUG checklist, http://www.
safemedicines.org/resources/001496.html. This version has been disseminated to
approximately 200 nurses in the San Diego region, and is being developed for
dissemination by the International Council of Nurses in the future. Interview with James
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Beyond educating patient and provider populations about the
risks of counterfeit drugs and parallel importation, alert systems
should also be implemented to provide information on detected
fakes. Currently, the World Health Organization has started a
rapid alert system," which, when fully implemented, may provide
some benefit to governments for the subsequent dissemination to
citizens of their respective countries. Perhaps more beneficial, the
Partnership for Safe Medicines has created an email alert network
system, allowing individuals to sign up for email alerts on
counterfeit medicine warnings for any government alert or
warning about fake drugs.'45 Additionally, the FDA Counterfeit
Alert Network 46 issues counterfeit drug warnings to groups who
then are responsible for warning their members. Programs such as
these should coordinate and work with the media to disseminate
relevant information to the general public.
B. Reporting Systems
As part of public policy addressing the potential for fake or
tainted medicines, a broad-based reporting structure is essential.
Patients, providers, public health staff, law enforcement, customs,
industry, researchers,'47 and others are all stakeholders who have
Class, Executive Dir. of the P'ship for Safe Meds., & Linda Carrier-Walker, Dir. of
Communications & External Relations, Int'l Council of Nurses, in Geneva, Switzerland
(Oct. 17, 2005).
144 See, e.g., Associated Press, WHO Launches Web-based System to Track Fake
Drugs, CTV, May 3, 2005, http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/
1115117564266_14/?hub=Health. The system is essentially an information
clearinghouse; reports sent, emailed, faxed and communicated to it are then disseminated
to national authorities. Note, however, that the system does not reach individual
consumers, primarily because certain part of the region to be served, Southeast Asia,
have a technology deficit. For example, countries such as Burma only have 0.5 Internet
users per 1,000, Cambodia has 2.2 per 1,000, and Laos has 2.7 per 1,000, compared with
Singapore with 504 per 1,000 and Malaysia with 320 per 1,000. See Marwaan Macan-
Markar, Fake Drugs in Poor Nations Worry Health Experts, CYBER DYARYO, May 16,
2005, http://www.cyberdyaryo.com/features/f2005_0516_03.htm.
145 The system is known as the SafeMeds Alert System. See Partnership for Safe
Medicines-SafeMeds Alert System sign-up page, http://www.safemedicines.org/
action/informed.phtml.
146 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Combating Counterfeit Drugs: A
Report of the Food and Drug Administration Annual Update, http://www.fda.gov/oc/
initiatives/counterfeit/update2005.html; Lutter, supra note 3.
147 Bryan A. Liang, Measuring the Impact of Counterfeit Drugs: Appling the Patient
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treatment, investigation, and enforcement roles and who must be a
part of this system.
The goal of such a reporting system is to provide information
outlining the epidemiology of fake or tainted medicines and
allowing effective public health and law enforcement
interventions. These interventions would require information on
location, patient diagnosis, harm, surrounding circumstances,
patient outcome, and methods to remediate harm. Because
counterfeit drugs are an international problem requiring an
international solution, an effective reporting system coordinating
and permitting international reporting and access to data is
imperative. 148
Effective reporting systems require simple forms. Basic
information to be collected would include:
" reporter name and contact information;
" location and date;
" patient diagnosis;
" suspect drug;
" drug source;
" sample available;
* patient harm;
" patient outcome;
* necessary treatment changes;
" any additional information.
To allow broad-based participation, the form should be user
friendly and accessible for use and communication, including
online, by fax, or by mail. 149
All reports should be sent to a single data repository site, at
least regionally, to allow ease of analysis and cross-party
Safety Reporting System Approach, Presentation to the World Intellectual Property
Association/Organization of Community Development Expert Meeting on Measurement
and Statistical Issues at Geneva, Switzerland (Oct. 18, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/
document/21/0,2340,en_2649_34173_3564782911 l1,00.html (displaying presentation
slides).
148 Id. Note that the United States and the European Union pledged cooperation and
zero tolerance on counterfeits. See, e.g., EU, US pledge Zero Tolerance on Fakes,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 30, 2005, http://www.catiaworld.com/cwnews/view.asp?
msglD=9084. However, no concrete details or efforts to share information or a reporting
structure are yet evident.
149 See Liang, supra note 147.
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assessment. 5 ° A single data site is important for integration of
reports and avoidance of the widely disparate and fragmented
condition that individual stakeholder reporting systems might
create. Of course, fields on the data reporting form may be altered
dependent upon the relevant stakeholder, so, for example,
discovery of fake medicines by customs officials would allow for
more detail in the drug source field.'5 ' Drop down menus and
other systems might be employed to further specify information by
reporter. 152
A single reporting system also allows for rapid dissemination
of information on suspect drugs by locale and facility to relevant
stakeholders, such as patients, providers, and public health staff.
Because reporting is broadened to include industry and broader
government stakeholders such as customs officials, alert systems
such as the World Health Organization rapid alert system, the
Partnership for Safe Medicines SafeMeds email alert system, and
the FDA alert system can be easily integrated and provide more
information to relevant parties more quickly.
Additional benefits of such a reporting structure go beyond
direct public health concerns. The epidemiology of counterfeits or
tainted medications may identify geographic sites, the type of
materials being used, and the drugs in question. 5 3  This can
provide information on the public economic burden faced by
governments, as well as the private economic burden faced by
providers, patients, and industries who must address the issue.
15 4
It will also allow more effective tracing through database analysis,
as well as effective application of geographic information systems
(GIS); GIS analyses could provide thematic mapping for public
health and investigation purposes.'55 An integrated reporting
150 A single data repository site would also make it easier for subsequent analysis of
data. The Aviation Safety Reporting System, which is optimal in reporting to improve
aviation safety, is a national database available for use by the government and the public,
including research. This has improved safety tremendously since the system's inception.
Its data has also been put in newsletter form for wider application and dissemination.
Aviation Safety Reporting System, http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/main-nf.htm.
151 See Liang, supra note 147.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. Note that, excipients of the fake or tainted drugs can be tracked using GIS,
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structure will also raise joint awareness of the problem between
stakeholders who may not have considered working together
before.
C. Penalties
As noted above, penalties for counterfeiting and selling
purportedly licit drugs are light. Immediate action by individual
countries is needed to remedy problems with drug counterfeiting
and the sale of counterfeit drugs. These countries need to
implement changes in criminal statutes and make international
consensus statements.'56
For example, criminal penalties for counterfeiting drugs must
match those for illicit drug production. The harm associated with
counterfeit drugs can be so dramatic and affect such a broad
array of patients that consideration of life imprisonment is
appropriate.'57 Forfeiture of assets and treble damages should also
be considered in statutes that address counterfeit drug sale and
manufacture.
Further, a limit on online pharmaceutical sales to those online
pharmacies that have established their compliance with national
safety standards would be beneficial.'58 Statutes characterizing
Internet drug sales that are not in compliance with these standards
as criminal trafficking of illicit drugs would send a clear message
which may allow for source identification and illicit transport pathways across country
lines supporting investigation and law enforcement efforts.
156 Unfortunately, parallel trade locations such as Europe have not come forth with
strong penalties or statements on the manufacture and sale of counterfeit drugs. Even
reform efforts have been highly limited. See, e.g., Huw Jones, EU to Crack Down on
Peddlers of Fake Products, REUTERS, July 12, 2005, http://today.reuters.com/News/
CrisesArticle.aspx?storyld=L 12615140 (describing a European Commission proposal for
criminal organizations that commit fraud using fakes that threaten the public health
should be imprisoned for at least four years and fined C100,000 to E200,000).
157 Some jurisdictions have considered such a bill, e.g., Iowa. See David Pitt, Iowa
House Passes Law Against Making Counterfeit Drugs, CEDAR FALLS COURIER, Apr. 22,
2005, http://www.wcfcourier.com/articles/2005/04/22/news/breaking-news/doc4268d24
b27870940659285.txt (reporting on a bill that penalizes involvement with the sale of
counterfeit drugs resulting in death by life in prison).
158 Bills have been introduced in Congress creating such requirements. See, e.g.,
Walden, Davis Re-introduce Rx Safety Bill: Legislation Would Protect Americans by
Establishing Safety Standards for Web-based Pharmacies, BEND.COM, Apr. 23, 2005,
http://bend.com/news/ar-view.php?arid=22371 (describing H.R.1808, the Safe Online
Drug Act of 2005).
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to online purveyors of drugs that these sales will not be taken
lightly. 5 9  Highly publicized prosecutions and stiff penalties
would drive at least some of these criminal operators out of the
fake medicine business.
Enforcement of provider licensure laws is appropriate if
providers are knowingly involved in the sale, distribution, or
manufacture of counterfeit drugs. Thankfully, in a vast majority
of U.S. cases, providers do not knowingly involve themselves in
distributing fake medications. However, if it can be shown that
providers are knowingly involved, they should not only be
prosecuted under existing criminal law, but also should be brought
up for disciplinary review by their respective professional boards.
In this way, the panoply of penalties will include significant
imprisonment, loss of assets, as well as potential loss of
professional capacity.
D. Technology Investment
Cooperative efforts, technological standardization, research
including radio frequency identification tags, holograms, and other
means must be engaged to ensure appropriate identification of
valid drugs and their pedigrees. 6 ° Research and development in
this area should be supported by public and private investment,
and should be developed internationally to harmonize their
applicability across country and hemispheric lines.
However, technology is presently a limited solution to the
problem of counterfeits associated with parallel trade. 16' The state
of the art of technology is not developed enough to support a
public policy solution relying upon it. Indeed, the critical problem
with current technology is that it is more useful as an inventory
device than as a system to identify pedigree or authenticity of the
159 In concert with these penalties against the seller of fake or tainted drugs,
penalties should also be considered against those who buy them. Although politically
sensitive, the tremendous public health risks associated with Internet and other unsafe
source purchases warrants the same kinds of penalties and protections akin to sales of
dangerous products illicitly, such as firearms.
160 See supra note 133.
161 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Announces New Initiative to Protect
the U.S. Drug Supply Through the Use of Radiofrequency Identification Technology,
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topicslnews/2004NEWO1133.htnl; see also supra notes 129-
133 and accompanying text (describing the limits of current technology).
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actual medicine itself. 62  Additionally, since the two largest
markets in the world-the United States and the European
Union-allow repackaging of medicines, numerous weaknesses in
current technological efforts undermine their present usefulness. 163
An investment in research and development of authentication
and pedigree of the actual drugs-rather than packaging-should
be an emphasis of public and private efforts. The current
underdeveloped status of technological means substantiates the
need to focus on this component of public policy to ensure safety
of the drug supply. It should be emphasized, however, that
technology can only be a part-not the entire-solution to the
risks of fake medicines entering into the drug supply, since the
creativity and adeptness of counterfeiters in the past has shown
their ability to keep up with technological advances.
VIII. Conclusion
Parallel trade in pharmaceuticals creates significant public
health risks. The world's experience has illustrated the
vulnerabilities that such trade creates, including, most importantly,
the influx of counterfeits into the drug supply.
To combat this problem, a multifaceted, multidisciplinary
approach is required that involves those who take the drugs, those
who prescribe and monitor them, those who inspect them, and
those who ensure their safety. This reality requires international
cooperation and a global effort to effectively detect, detain,
prosecute, and imprison those who would profit by cheating the
public's health. The producers and distributors of counterfeits are
killers, and their presence should attract the attention, resources,
and penalties appropriate for murderers.
Until there is a focused, sustained, and effective effort to
successfully address the issues of counterfeit drugs in parallel
trade, such a policy is inappropriate for the closed system in the
United States, which has generally ensured a high-level of safety.
We should not fall into the trap of believing that simply because
one can buy legitimate drugs from an Internet seller through
parallel trade means that all drugs so purchased are safe. The first,
162 Even then, there is significant error associated with technology use. See
Giacalone, supra note 130.
163 See Giacalone, supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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tenth, or hundredth medicine taken may be real, or it at least may
not be fatal. But it takes only one event that harms or kills to show
the risk of such a policy; and by then, it will be too late.
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